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This dissertation has three parts that study the impact of inf rmation technology
on competition and vertical relationships from different perspectives.
The first part focuses on an electronic market where product information
is important for consumers to identify their ideal product and the Internet greatly
reduces consumers’ search cost. The model studies how reduced search cost influ-
ences social welfare and retailers’ incentive to provide product information. It is
found that if technology reduces consumers’ search cost to evaluate products and
compare prices, sellers who invest in providing valuable information may not be
able to recover their investments. Therefore, by lowering sellers’ incentive to pro-
v
vide product information, reduced search cost may negatively impact social welfare
as consumers have to search more to identify their ideal product. The study also
shows that sellers need to develop the capability of, and reputation for, information
provision in order to make profits, even though some consumers and sellers may
free ride.
The second part extends the first model. In the second model, the manufac-
turer decides whether to distribute products through the electronic or the physical
channel, or through both the channels. In the model, different channels have differ-
ent search costs for consumers, different abilities to offer product information, and
different reach to consumers. The model suggests that the manufacturer uses both
the channels when product information is very valuable and pro uct information
is largely about digital attributes, or when the product information is not valuable.
The model also suggests that when the manufacturer chooses to ll hrough both
the channels the manufacturer need not sell through the mostwell-known electronic
retailer. This part also discusses the case where the manufacture is vertically inte-
grated. That is, the manufacturer itself operates in one of the channels.
The third part continues the second part and focuses on firms’vertical in-
tegration (VI) strategy. It examines firms included in 1995-1997 InformationWeek
500 and COMPUSTAT database to study the impact of competitiveenvironment
on how IT affects the level of vertical integration. It is found that the competitive
environment moderates the impact of IT on vertical integration - in more dynamic
environments IT is associated with a decrease in VI, and in more stable environ-
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Chapter 1
Implications of Reduced Search Cost
and Free Riding in E-Commerce
1.1 Introduction
It is argued that electronic markets are frictionless and therefore more efficient than
physical markets. In fact price comparison engines (a.k.a shopbots) may eliminate
all search costs. For instance, if a consumer wants to purchase a book on the Inter-
net, she can visit pricescan.com and receive real-time pricinformation from more
than 20 book sellers. The consumer can then jump directly to one seller’s website to
make the final purchase. However, an important function of a market is to provide
information services for consumers to assess their satisfaction from consuming the
product as well as information about how to use the product after purchasing it.
This information is costly to provide. If some firms provide this information but do
not make any sales because of the presence of price comparison engines/shopbots,
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it reduces their incentive to provide this information.
The free riding problem was first examined by Telser [102]. Heargued that
retail competition might dissuade retailers from offeringpresale services. Retailers
providing presale information, incur additional costs, therefore they must charge
a higher price compared to those who do not provide these services. A consumer
may be convinced to purchase the product by the services provided by the retailer.
However, the consumer may buy the product from another retailer who charges a
lower price. In this way, retailers who do not provide the service free ride on those
who provide the service.
Many researchers have studied instances of free riding. Sinley and Williams
[96] found that free riding consumers take advantage of salesperson’s expertise and
time, but have no intention of buying from the store. They note that free riding
increases the price disparity between free riding and non-free riding retailers, and
drives consumers not currently free riding to free ride in the future. Free riding also
leads to less information and services provided for consumers, and therefore leads
to less demand for the product [78]. In spite of the free-riding problem, in physi-
cal markets full-service sellers still exist as high searchcost deters consumers from
free riding. However, in electronic markets, the distance between any two stores is
just a click away. If the reduced search costs enable consumer to asily find lower
prices, it is not clear if any seller would provide free information service.
In the model presented in this chapter, we examine a market whre informa-
tion service is valuable to consumers, and retailers compete to sell a set of horizon-
tally differentiated products. In particular, we examine th incentives of sellers to
2
provide free information service when consumers’ search costs are reduced. The
paper is related to the literature in economics and in information systems. First,
in the search cost literature [107, 90, 100] consumers search fo lower prices for
commodity products. In this literature consumers don’t need any information ser-
vice; they simply search for lower prices. This literature th refore sidesteps the free
riding problem. In this paper consumers have to first search for and receive product
information before purchasing the product.
Second, Alba et al. [2] and Bakos [9] make the point that electronic markets
not only lower search cost for price information but also lower search cost for prod-
uct information. Electronic markets enable consumers to easily compare products
sold by competing vendors. Therefore, by providing productinformation, sellers
can differentiate themselves and decrease consumers’ price sensitivity. This point
is also made by Lal [66], Lynch and Ariely [59], and Zettelmeyer [115]. In these
models sellers sell heterogeneous products, therefore, service providers do not need
to worry about the free riding problem. In the model presented in this chapter, sell-
ers sell homogeneous product, so product information is, toome extent, a public
good.
Third, the literature suggests that lower search costs should make electronic
markets more efficient than comparable physical markets andthe market price
should go down to the competitive price [16]. However, in markets where con-
sumers need information service before their purchase, it is expected that competi-
tive price would eliminate the sellers’ incentive to provide information service and
may prevent the likelihood of trade, thereby reducing social welfare.
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It is found that as long as a certain proportion of consumers have a positive
search cost, some sellers do provide free information servic . Even in the presence
of free riding, sellers are better off incurring the costs ofproviding free information
service and having the reputation as sellers who provide information service, as
against sellers who always free ride. It is also found that asthe competition in the
market increases, fewer sellers provide free information service.
In this market a decrease in search cost has a direct and an indirect impact on
the social welfare. The direct impact is that a decrease in search cost increases social
welfare by decreasing the cost of each search. The indirect impact is that it reduces
social welfare by reducing sellers’ incentives to provide information service, which
in turn increases the amount of search required by consumers. The net impact
of reduced search cost on social welfare depends on which effect is stronger. This
suggests that if free riding is also considered, a decrease in search cost may increase
or decrease social welfare.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The model andits assump-
tions are described in section 2. The equilibrium is presented in section 3 and sec-
tion 4 examines the impact of different parameters on the equilibri m. We conclude
in section 5 with a discussion of the main results.
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1.2 The Model
There is a continuum1 of risk neutral sellers, with massS. A retailer sells different
categories or classes2of products. In this model sellers are electronic retailerswho
compete by sellingN (N ≥ 2) horizontally differentiated products for a product
category. The paper examines the case of a specific product category. Sellers are of
two types. A proportionα (0 < α < 1) of the sellers, called type-1 sellers, have the
reputation for and the capability to provide free pre-sale information service. The
rest of the sellers, called type-2 sellers, do not provide any information service. The
main difference between the two types of sellers is that type-1 s llers can choose
whether to provide information service for a specific product category, while type-
2 sellers do not have the ability to provide any information service3. It is assumed
that the sellers’ ability to provide information service isindependent of the model
i.e.,α is exogenous.
The objective of providing the information service for a specific category is
to help consumers identify their ideal product and to provide information about how
to use and maintain the product4. It may be noted that information service serves
1This implies that the number of sellers is very large and can be regarded as infinite. This
assumption is widely used in the search cost literature [13,17, 90].
2A book retailer sells books and books on Game Theory may be considered a product category.
Similarly, an Electronic Goods’ store sells consumer durables, and Projection TVs may be consid-
ered as a product category.
3Type-2 sellers can’t provide information service, as sellers need to first incur a significant sunk
cost to build the infrastructure for providing informationservice. For example, providing informa-
tion service requires a significant investment in technological capabilities and domain expertise that
may be beyond the type-2 sellers capacity. It is also an enduring reality of electronic markets that
there exist sellers who never provide information service.
4It is assumed that the information service is objective. Theconsumers may also believe that
the retailers provide an unbiased description of the products, and they are more likely to trust the
information service provided by the retailers compared to the information service provided by the
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more than one purpose. First, it helps consumers in identifyi g the product that
fits them best. Second, information service is useful to consumers as it provides
information about how to use and maintain a product. Therefore, the information
service for a specific category helps consumers receive the maximum utility from
consuming their ideal product. Every consumer who visits a type-1 store can ac-
cess the information service, if the type-1 seller providesinformation service for
that category, regardless of whether she purchases at that store. All sellers procure
products at constant marginal cost, which is normalized to zer without loss of gen-
erality. However, type-1 sellers incur a cost ofV > 0, if they provide information
service for a specific product category. This cost is independent of the number of
consumers who visit the electronic store to access the information service.
There is a continuum of risk neutral unit demand consumers with massB.
A consumer in the model is interested in the specific product category under con-
sideration. However, each consumer has one ideal product (i.e., 1 out ofN in that
product category) that maximizes her utility and she derives a utility of R > 0 from
consuming this product. However, if a consumers purchases aproduct at random,
she receives an expected utility ofr > 0 wherer < R. It is assumed that each
product matchesB/N consumers and that each consumer needs the information
service to identify her ideal product.
It is also assumed that there are two types of consumers. A proporti n β
(0 < β < 1) of the consumers have zero search cost. These consumers enjoy
the process of visiting stores and evaluating different products. Hence they are
manufacturers.
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referred to as shoppers [100]. The remaining consumers havea positive search
cost K (K > 0). These consumers are referred to as non-shoppers. Therefore,
the impact of electronic markets on consumers’ search costsan be interpreted as
decreasingK . As is common in this literature, it is also assumed that consumers
have perfect recall i.e., they can return to any seller they have previously visited
without any additional cost. It is also assumed thatr > K , i.e., the product category
is important to consumers so that they will always make a purchase.
1.3 Market Equilibrium
Each seller takes as given the consumers’ equilibrium behavior nd the strategy of
the different types of sellers, and chooses its strategy to maxi ize expected profits.
For a specific product category, sellers choose their information service and pricing
strategy. First, the type-1 sellers determine whether to provide information service
for that product category. If a type-1 seller provides information service for a spe-
cific product category, it is refereed to as type-1a seller for that product category. If
a type-1 seller does not provide information service for a specific product category,
it is referred to as a type-1b seller for that product category. Therefore for each
product category, there are three types of sellers, type-1a, type-1b, and type-2. Of
course as stated above, type-2 sellers do not provide information service for any
product category. It is to be noted that for a given product category, all the sellers
sell all theN products.
We focus on the symmetric equilibrium (as in Varian [107] andStahl [100]),
where type-1 sellers choose to provide information servicefor a specific product
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category with the same probability and sellers set prices according to the price dis-
tribution function of their type. Letθ be the probability that a type-1 seller provides
information service for the product category under consideration, andfg(·), Fg(·),
hg(lg) (g ∈ {1a, 1b, 2}) denote the density, cumulative distribution, and the highest
(lowest) price charged by type-g sellers for this product category. Given that all the
products in the category have the same expected demand, it isassumed that a type-1
seller charges the same price for all the products in the category5. It is clear that
there is no pure strategy equilibrium where all type-1 sellers provide information
service for a specific product category6.
Consumers need the information service to identify their ideal product. The
value of information of information service is the difference in utility from buy-
ing their ideal product after receiving the information service, R, and the utility of
buying a product at random,r . Consumers know who has the ability to provide in-
formation service i.e., they know who is a type-1 seller and who is a type-2 seller7.
However, consumers do not know if a type-1 seller provides information service for
their category of interest, unless they visit the type-1 seller. Therefore, a consumer
will search for information service, if the value of the information service,R − r ,
is greater than the expected cost of finding the information service. However, if the
5This assumption is stronger than necessary. The results hold as long as the difference between
the utility from consuming the ideal product and a non-idealproduct is greater than the search cost
K . The assumption of equal prices is just used to simplify the exposition.
6If all type-1 sellers provide information service for a specific product category, then each type-1
seller has an incentive to not provide information service for that product category and to charge a
slightly reduced price.
7For example, consumers know that Amazon.com and Barnesandnoble.com provide information
service. Therefore consumers visit one or more of such stores identify their ideal product in the
product category of interest. On the other hand, consumers ar ure that some on-line stores never
provide information service for any product.
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value of the information service is lower than the expected cost of finding the infor-
mation service, a consumer may not search for information service, and may buy
a product at random. In this paper we focus on the case where thvalue of infor-
mation service,R − r , is greater than the expected cost of finding the information
service so that consumers search for information service. Later the case where the
cost of finding the information service is greater than its value is briefly discussed.
If the value of information service,R − r , is greater than its expected cost,
consumers will search for information service to identify their ideal product. After
having identified their ideal product a consumer may search for lower price amongst
type-2 sellers. In other words, a consumer’s search strategy is divided into two
stages. In stage-1, if she decides to search for informationservice, she will search
amongst type-1 sellers for information service. In each visit to a type-1 seller,
she will learn the prices charged for theN products in that category, and assess
the information service, if the seller provides information service for that category.
In stage-2, she will search for lower price. Since she knows that, on average, a
type-2 seller charges a lower price (as some type-1 sellers incur a cost to provide
information service), in stage-2 she will only search amongtype-2 sellers. As stated
earlier shoppers have zero search cost and non-shoppers hava positive search cost
K , whereK is the cost of visiting an electronic store for a specific product category,
and learning the prices charged. For each visit in stage-1, the non-shoppers incur
an additional cost to check if the seller provides information service. If this seller
provides information service, the non-shoppers incur an additional cost to read this
information. It is assumed that compared toK , the cost of checking for and reading
9
the information is ignorable8.
A shopper has zero search cost. Therefore, in stage-2 a shopper will search
the whole market to find the lowest price. On the other hand, a non-shopper’s
decision to search in stage-2 is contingent upon whether theexp cted gain from an
additional search outweighs her search costK . That is if q is the lowest price a
non-shopper has observed in stage-1 andq satisfies:
∫ q
0
(q − p) f 2(p)dp =
∫ q
0
F2(p)dp ≤ K (1.1)
she will stop and purchase at the type-1 seller chargingq. Otherwise, she will visit
type-2 sellers until she finds a seller whose priceq satisfies equation (1.1).
Proposition 1.1 Let Eπg(·) (g ∈ {1a, 1b, 2}) be the expected profits of a type-g
seller from a specific product category. In equilibrium,
(a) Eπg(p) ≤ π∗g for every price p, and Eπg(p) = π
∗
g for every price p in the
support of Fg(·).
(b) π∗1a = π
∗
1b.
For a specific product category a type-1 seller chooses to provide informa-
tion service with probabilityθ , and each type-g seller sets a price according to
Fg(p). In equilibrium, all the sellers of one type have the same expected profits.
Moreover, type-1a and type-1b sellers also have the same expected profits, other-
wise θ is not the equilibrium probability. For example, ifπ∗1a < π
∗
1b, a type-1a
8The cost of checking for and reading the information is ignored here for simplicity. The results
in this paper are not influenced by the cost of checking for andrea ing the information in stage-1.
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seller would be better off if it were to stop providing information service for that
specific category.
In the equilibrium, each type-1 seller charges a price that satisfies equation
(1.1). Otherwise, no consumer will purchase from that seller. As long as equation
(1.1) holds, no non-shopper has an incentive to search in stage-2. Therefore, con-
sumers’ equilibrium search behavior is; (a) a non-shopper,as long as equation (1.1)
is satisfied, always stops her search in stage-1 after visiting a type-1a seller, and
purchases her ideal product from the type-1 seller chargingthe lowest price that she
has seen in her search sequence, (b) a shopper, after identifying her ideal product
in stage-1 will search the whole market in stage-2 and purchase er ideal product
from a type-2 seller charging the lowest price for that product. Therefore, as in
Stahl [100], in equilibrium, type-2 sellers are only able tosell to shoppers at the
competitive price (p = 0) andF2(p) degenerates to a point (p = 0). Note that
when entering the market the type-2 sellers aim to make smallpositive profits, but
competition forces them to charge the competitive price. Onthe other hand, type-1
sellers charge positive prices and make strictly positive profits9. Finally, equation
(1.1) can be rewritten as:
q ≤ K (1.2)
It is clear from the equilibrium behavior of sellers and consumers that no
type-1 seller charges the competitive price, and that all shoppers search and pur-
chase in stage-2 from type-2 sellers at the competitive price. It is also clear that
9Assume that type-1 sellers make zero profits. Then type-1a sellers should charge positive prices
to recoverV . If the lowest price that type-1a sellers charge isl1a > 0, a type-1b seller can always
make positive profits by chargingl1a −ε > 0. Therefore, a contradiction to proposition 1.1. In other
words type-1 sellers always charge positive prices and makestrictly positive profits.
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type-1 sellers only sell to non-shoppers. A non-shopper search s a sequence of
type-1 sellers until she finds information service (i.e., finds a type-1a seller). After
receiving the information service she purchases her ideal product from the seller
charging the lowest price in the sequence of type-1 sellers visited by her. Of course,
if a non-shopper visits a type-1a seller as the first seller shvisits, she will purchase
her ideal product from this type-1a seller.











θ [1 − F1a(p)]
{1 − (1 − θ)[1 − F1b(p)]}2
(1.4)
For a specific product category, a type-1b seller never charges a price higher
than or equal toh1a, otherwise, no consumer will return to buy from this seller.It
can also be shown thath1b is infinitely close toh1a. Or, equivalently, the support of
F1b(·) is [l1b, h1a).
Proposition 1.3 All type-1a sellers charge the same price for all the products in a
product category, i.e., l1a = h1a = K.
The equilibrium price distribution of type-1b andl1b andh1a are as shown
below.
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From equation (1.6) and proposition 1.3,






The above analysis assumes that non-shoppers search until they find infor-
mation service, i.e., they search until they visit a type-1aseller. In other words if the
value of information service,R − r, is greater than its expected cost,K/θ, a non-
shopper will search until she finds information service. To see this assume that
a non-shopper has visited several type-1b sellers and has not yet found a service
provider. If the lowest price that she has observed so far isq, she will continue to
search for information service if the expected value from another search is greater
than her search cost i.e., ifθ(R − r ) + (1 − θ)
∫ q
l1b
F1b(p)dp > K . However, as
long asR − r > K/θ , θ(R − r ) + (1 − θ)
∫ q
l1b
F1b(p)dp is always greater thanK .
As a result non-shoppers will always search until they find information service, and
all the results discussed above hold. On the other hand, ifR− r < K/θ , some non-
shoppers may purchase without receiving information servic . In this paper we are
interested in examining the incentives of sellers to provide free information service
when information service is valuable for consumers to identify their ideal product.
The case whenR − r < K/θ is not discussed further, as information service is not
13
very important in these markets.
1.4 Equilibrium Analysis and Implications
We first examine the impact of the proportion of type-1 sellers (α), proportion of
shoppers (β), and search cost (K ) on the competition and the type-1 sellers’ incen-
tive to provide free information service (θ∗) for a specific product category. The
impact ofα, β, andK on social welfare is analyzed subsequently.
1.4.1 Managerial Implications
Result 1.1 (a) There is no equilibrium where all type-1 sellers provide information
service for a specific product category i.e.,θ < 1; (b) θ decreases withα and
increases with B.
A manager needs to investigate both market related (α and B) and search
cost related parameters (K andβ) to arrive at the firm’s information service and
pricing strategy. First, as long as non-shoppers search forin mation service,
type-1 sellers make positive profits whereas type-2 sellersmake zero profits. The
reason is that non-shoppers purchase from type-1 sellers atpositive prices whereas
shoppers purchase at type-2 sellers at the competitive pric. The point is that the
price competition amongst type-2 sellers competing for zero s arch cost consumers
drives their prices down to the competitive level. The analysis in this paper suggests
that in markets where information service is valuable to consumers, sellers who do
not provide any information service will find it difficult to make positive profits.
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In this model profits are the economic rents of the reputationfor and the
capability to provide free information service. From a managerial perspective, if
consumers value information service, sellers need to establish themselves in the
information service market in order to make positive profits. This is true even if
some sellers and consumers free ride. Intuitively, non-shoppers visit a sequence of
type-1 sellers for information service. However, as non-shoppers cannot distinguish
between type-1a and type-1b sellers they may visit some type-1b sellers before they
visit a type-1a seller in their search for information service. Therefore, if a non-
shopper visits a few type-1b sellers before visiting a type-1a seller, after receiving
the information service from a type-1a seller, she may go back and purchase from a
visited type-1b seller charging a lower price. This enablestype-1b sellers to charge
positive prices and make positive profits.
Type-1a and type-1b sellers make equal profits. This is explained as follows.
A non-shopper, on visiting a type-1b seller, may continue tosearch for information
service amongst type-1 sellers. However, a consumer may notpurchase from a type-
1b seller if it later visits another type-1b seller charginga lower price. On the other
hand if a consumer visits a type-1a seller as the first seller sh visits, she always
stops her search and purchases from this type-1a seller. This is because a type-1a
seller’s price makes another search unprofitable for a non-sh pper. Therefore, in
equilibrium the savings of a type-1b seller from not providing nformation service
for a specific category are equal to the expected loss from consumers continuing to
search for information service. The nature of the mixed strategy equilibrium is such
that it makes a type-1 seller indifferent between being a type-1a or a type-1b seller.
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In this way type-1 sellers make equal profits and are indifferent to free riding. The
key point is that in equilibrium no seller can profitably (i.e., make more profits than
type-1a sellers) free ride on other sellers by charging a lower price.
It is clear that the incentive of type-1 sellers to provide free information ser-
vice (θ) decreases with the increase in the proportion of type-1 seller (α). In other
words, the higher the proportion of type-1 sellers, fewer type-1 sellers provide in-
formation service for a product category. It is interestingthat in a market where
information service is valuable to consumers, if there is anincrease in the number
of sellers with the capability to provide information service, i.e., if the market be-
comes more competitive, a smaller proportion of type-1 sellers provide information
service. This is due to the fact that the profits of each type-1s ller decreases with
the increase in competition (an increase in the proportion of type-1 sellers) as the
profits from selling to non-shoppers is shared amongst a larger number of type-1
sellers. However, the profits of type-1a sellers decrease mor than the profits of
type-1b sellers, causing some type-1a sellers to switch to bec ming type-1b sellers,
resulting in a lowerθ 10. It is also apparent that as the demand (B) for a product cat-
egory increases, the probability that a type-1 seller will provide information service
for that category increases.
Result 1.2 (a) θ increases with K and decreases withβ; (b) There exists a K′ > 0,
and β ′ > 0, such that when K≤ K ′, or β > β ′, no seller provides information
service, i.e., there is no market with sellers providing freeinformation service.
10It can be easily shown thatEπ1a = (1 − β)BK/(αS) − V andEπ1b = θ(1 − β)BK/(αS). It
is clear that|∂Eπ1a/∂α| ≥ |∂Eπ1b/∂α| = θ |∂Eπ1a/∂α|.
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It is clear that the incentive to provide information service generally de-
creases, with a decrease in the search cost, and with an increase in the proportion of
shoppers. Given other parameters, if the search cost is verylow, or the proportion
of shoppers is very high, a manager should decide not to provide free information
service, as the firm would not be able to recover the cost of providing this service. It
is said that high search cost may lead to market failures [9].However, this research
suggests that low search cost may also lead to market failure, as consumers may not
have access to information service to identify their ideal product. This suggests that
when search cost is very low, firms should provide information service only when
they are able to charge for the service. This fee can be implemented in different
ways. For instance, some sellers ask consumers to pay for theinformation service,
and in some electronic stores consumers need to register by providing biographi-
cal information before they can receive the information servic . Therefore, there
are circumstances where increased search costs not only increase sellers’ profits,
but also benefit consumers by increasing sellers’ incentiveto provide information
service.
1.4.2 Social Welfare Analysis
This section examines the impact ofα, β, andK on social welfare. LetBT Sand
ST Sbe the consumers’ and sellers’ total surplus. Consumers’ total surplusBT S
is equal toB · R − T P − T SC, whereT P is the consumers’ total payment, and
T SC is the consumers’ total search cost. It is straightforward that each consumer,
on average, visits 1/θ type-1 sellers. Since the cost of visiting a type-1 seller for
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a non-shopper isK , the total search cost is(1 − β)BK/θ . Sellers’ total surplus is
ST S= T P − SαθV . Therefore, social welfare,W is,




Therefore,∂W/∂θ = (1 − β)BK/θ2 − SαV . From equation (1.7), it is
clear that(1−β)BK > SαV , so∂W/∂θ > 0. The intuition is that an increase inθ
has two effects; (i) it increases social welfare by loweringconsumers’ total search
cost for information service, as there are a higher number oftype-1a sellers, and
(ii) it decreases social welfare by increasing sellers’ cost of providing information
service, as more type-1a sellers incur the information servic costV . However, the
first effect outweighs the second. Therefore, when more sellr provide informa-
tion service, social welfare increases. The other parameters also influence social
welfare. Equation (1.8) can be written asW = w(θ(α, β, K ), α, β, K ). In
other words, each parameter has two effects on social welfare. First, it has a direct
impact. Second, it also influences social welfare by influencing θ .
The impact of a decrease inK on social welfare is examined first. The
direct impact of a decrease inK is that social welfare increases as consumers’
cost of each search is reduced. The indirect impact of a decrease inK is that it
decreases social welfare as a decrease inK decreases a seller’s incentive to provide
information service (θ). The total impact of a decrease inK is determined by the
sum of the direct and the indirect impacts and can either increase or decrease social
welfare. It is straightforward that∂2W/∂K 2 < 0. That is, asK decreases (so
θ also decreases), the direct impact dominates the indirect impact as long asθ is
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sufficiently high. In other words, when there are a large number of type-1a sellers
a decrease inK increases social welfare by reducing consumers’ search cost, as
there are still enough service providers in the market. However, below a certain
value ofθ a decrease inK causes the indirect impact to dominate the direct impact.
In other words, when there are a small number of type-1a seller to begin with, a
decrease inK reduces social welfare by reducing type-1 sellers incentivto provide
information service and as a result consumers have to searcha much larger number
of type-1 sellers to find information service, even though the cost of each search
is reduced. The impact of an increase in the proportion of shoppers (β) on social
welfare is analogous to the impact of a decrease inK . This analysis suggests that
depending on the value ofθ , a decrease in search cost (K ) or an increase in the
proportion of shoppers (β), may increase or decrease social welfare.
Next the impact of the proportion of type-1 sellers (α) is examined. The
direct impact of an increase inα is a decrease in social welfare as it increases
society’s cost of information service. The indirect impactof an increase inα is a
decrease in social welfare as it reduces a seller’s incentive to provide information
service. Therefore an increase inα unambiguously reduces social welfare.
1.5 Conclusion
The model presented here examines a market where information service is costly to
provide but has the characteristics of a public good. Consumers on the other hand
use the information service to identify their ideal product. However, after receiving
the information service consumers may search for a lower price. The paper exam-
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ines the competition in horizontally differentiated markets where information ser-
vice is valuable to consumers to identify their ideal product and where technology
reduces consumers’ search cost. The analysis suggests thatin is setting a seller
needs to develop the capability of and reputation for servicprovision to make pos-
itive profits. Otherwise, no non-shopper will visit them forservice and purchase
from them. This is true even though there are sellers and consumers who free ride.
The analysis also suggests that a seller cannot make positive profits by free-riding
all the time. It is interesting to note that when the competition in the market for
information provision increases, fewer sellers provide information service. In the
market examined in this paper, increased competition amongst i formation service
providers is not in the interests of the incumbent firms as well as the society at large.
Obviously, incumbents do not prefer increased competitionas it reduces their prof-
its. Similarly, from social welfare perspective, an increas in competition reduces
social welfare. It is also clear that if the search cost is toolow, or if the proportion
of shoppers is very high, no seller will provide any free information service.
The model also provides another interesting social welfareresult. A decrease
in search cost may increase or decrease social welfare. When alarge proportion
of sellers provide information service, a decrease in search cost increases social
welfare by decreasing the cost of each search. On the other hand, if the proportion of
sellers providing information service is low, a decrease insearch cost reduces social
welfare by reducing sellers incentive to provide information service which in turn
increases the amount of search required by consumers. This sugge ts that if free
riding is also considered, a decrease in search cost may increase or decrease social
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welfare. As indicated earlier all these results apply to horizontally differentiated
markets where information service is valuable for consumers to identify their ideal
product. If the expected utility of buying a product at random is not very different
from searching for information service to identify ones ideal product, the above
results need further exploration.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.2A common result in the search cost literature is
that there are no point masses inF1b(·). The intuition is that some consumers will
visit two or more type-1b sellers for a specific product. If there is a point mass atp′
the type-1b sellers chargingp′ can increase its profits by lowering the price slightly.
This violates proposition 1.1.
Since no shopper purchases from type-1 sellers, the expected demand of
type-1 sellers comes from non-shoppers. Each non-shopper keeps on searching
type-1 sellers until she finds a type-1a seller. Each search finds a type-1a seller with
probabilityθ . Therefore, in the first round, on average,θ(1−β)B non-shoppers will
find information service and the rest(1 − θ)(1 − β)B non-shoppers will continue
to search. Therefore,(1 − θ)n−1θ(1 − β)B non-shoppers need to search exactly
n sellers to find information service. Each type-1 seller, irrespective of whether
it provides information service for this product category is sampled by a specific
consumer with the same probability 1/(αS). Therefore, in thenth round, it is visited
by (1 − θ)n−1(1 − β)B/(αS) non-shoppers.
The demand of a type-1a seller chargingp comes from two kinds of non-
shoppers: (i) those who visit this seller as the first type-1 seller they visit. They
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will stop and purchase at this seller, so the expected demandfrom this kind of
consumers is(1−β)B/(αS), (ii) those who visitn−1 (n=2, 3, . . . ) type-1b sellers
before visiting this seller. Each of these consumers will purchase from this seller if
it charges a price lower than then − 1 type-1b sellers she has already visited. As a
result, [1− F1b(p)]n−1(1− θ)n−1(1− β)B/(αS) non-shoppers will purchase from






[(1 − θ)(1 − F1b(p))]
n−1 ⇒ Equation (1.3)
The expected demand of a type-1b seller chargingp is derived by summing
the expected demand from consumers who receive informationservice in thenth
(n = 2, 3, ...) round. For any non-shopper who receives information servic in the
nth (n = 2, 3, ...) round, she will return and purchase at a type-1b seller if and only
if she has visited this seller in the firstn − 1 rounds, which occurs with probability
(n − 1)/[(1 − θ)αS], and that this seller’s price is the lowest in the sequence of
sellers visited, which occurs with probability [1− F1b(p)]n−2[1 − F1a(p)]. So
the demand from these non-shoppers is(1− θ)n−1θ(1− β)B[1 − F1b(p)]n−2[1 −
F1a(p)](n − 1)/[(1 − θ)αS]. D1b(p) is calculated by summing up these demands.

Proof of Proposition 1.3 This is proved by ruling out the possibilities that
l1a 6= h1a.
For a specific product, a type-1b seller never charges a pricehigher than or
equal toh1a, otherwise, no consumer will buy this product from this seller. Suppose
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that there exists ap′ such thath1b < p′ < h1a. If p′ is in the support ofF1a(·),
then from equation (1.3), we haveD1a(h1a) = D1a(p′), as no consumer visits more
than one type-1a seller. Sincep′ < h1a, Eπ1a(h1a) > Eπ1a(p′), which violates
proposition 1.1. So, no type-1a seller chargesp′, i.e., F1a(p′) = F1a(h1b). The
type-1b seller who chargesh1b will earn profits only from consumers who first visit
this seller and then immediately visit a type-1a seller charging h1a. If this seller
chargesp′, its expected demand does not change, butp′ is strictly higher thanh1b.
So if it chargesp′, a price not in the support ofF1b(·), it will be strictly better off.
This also violates proposition 1.1. Therefore,h1b is infinitely close toh1a. Or,
equivalently, the support ofF1b(·) is [l1b, h1a).
Since it has been already shown that1b is infinitely close toh1a andF1b(p)
is continuous, there are just two possibilities that need tobe considered.
(1) Suppose thatl1a < l1b. Then one can always find ap′ such thatl1a <
p′ < l1b. It is clear thatD1a(l1a) = D1a(p′).Therefore,Eπ1a(p′) = p′D1a(p′) −
V > Eπ1a(l1a). This violates proposition 1.1.












1 − (1 − θ)(1 − F1b(l1a))
l1a − V
Solving Eπ1a(l1a) = Eπ1a(h1a),
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θ [1 − F1a(l1a)]
[1 − (1 − θ)(1 − F1b(l1a))]2
l1a
Substituting equation (1.9) into the above equation, results in Eπ1b(l1a) =
[(1 − β)B/(αS)]θ [1−F1a(l1a)]h21a/ l1a. Suppose that̃p is in the support ofF1b(p),
and p̃ is infinitely close toh1a. Sol1b ≤ l1a ≤ p̃. If it chargesp̃, its expected profits
will be Eπ1b( p̃) = [(1 − β)B/(αS)]θ [1− F1a( p̃)] p̃. FromEπ1b(l1a) = Eπ1b( p̃),
yields:
[1 − F1a( p̃)] p̃ = [1 − F1a(l1a)]
h21a
l1a
Since it is always true thatl1a ≤ p̃ < h1aand F1a(l1a) ≤ F1a( p̃) < 1, the
equation above never holds. In sum,l1a = h1a. Since anyq ∈ [l1b, h1a] satisfies
equation (1.2), it is straightforward that a type-1a sellerchargesK . 












{1 − (1 − θ)[1 − F1b(p)]}2
(1.10)
In the equilibrium, every type-1b seller has the same expected profits. As-
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sume that bothp and p̃ are in the support ofF1b(·), and p̃ is infinitely close toh1a.
Therefore,











Solving Eπ1b(p) = Eπ1b( p̃), results in equation (1.5). SinceF1b(l1b) = 0,
l1b = θ2h1a. As Eπ1a = [(1 − β)B/(αS)]h1a − V , solving Eπ1b( p̃) = Eπ1a







The IS literature has examined the impact of information technology on markets in
terms of the implications of reduced search costs [9, 16]. The salience of reduced
search costs is manifested in the increasing reach of the electronic channel [36].
However, a key function of the market is to provide product information that enables
consumers to identify their ideal product [24, 44, 54, 86]. In the physical distribu-
tion channel, retailers provide product information through product demonstrations
and test-drives. On the other hand, in the electronic channel, technologies such
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asVisualizationare improving and allowing electronic retailers to provideincreas-
ingly sophisticated information to consumers. Jiang and Benbasat [62] study vir-
tual product experience (VPE) technology where visual control allows consumers
to manipulate web product images and functional control enables consumers to ex-
perience different features of a product. For example, at Landsend.com, consumers
can create images of their body shape to virtually “try on” app rel items to see how
an item will fit them [105].
A manufacturer has to decide how to distribute its products to the ulti-
mate consumers. A manufacturer’s distribution strategy isinfluenced, among other
things, by the characteristics of the product (i.e., the information services required
to demonstrate, use, and service the product [85]) and the nature of the competi-
tion in the retail market [104]. Prior research also suggests that not all products
are sold through every channel [18]. Therefore, the objectiv of this research is to
analytically examine how the reduced search cost and the incr asing reach of the
electronic channel, along with the increasing ability of the electronic channel to
provide product information, affect a manufacturer’s distribution strategy.
The distribution literature indicates that if the manufacturer sells through in-
dependent retailers, two kinds of externalities need to be considered — pricing and
service externality [22]. The pricing externality is that ech retailer makes pricing
decisions to maximize its own profits but does not consider the manufacturer’s prof-
its. This causes the retailer to charge a retail price that isdifferent from the price that
maximizes the manufacturer’s profits. A manufacturer may also expect the retailer
to provide information services, such as product demonstrations and test-drives, that
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increase a consumer’s demand, utility for the product, and the willingness to pay
[111]. The second externality deals with the provision of such information services,
as the retailer may not have the incentive to provide as much information service
as the manufacturer would like. The free-riding problem makes this externality
more complex than the pricing externality [78, 102]. For example, if each con-
sumer receives product information at a service provider and then purchases from a
non-service provider for a lower price, no retailer would provide these information
services. Free riding, therefore, leads to a reduction in information service provided
to consumers, which leads to reduced demand for the product [78]. A suboptimal
level of information service may reduce the manufacturer’sprofits.
The literature in Marketing has studied the above problems largely in the
context of the traditional physical channel [56, 58, 60, 79]. However, the electronic
channel has different characteristics compared with the physical channel. First, the
retailers in the electronic channel provide different leves of information services
compared with the retailers in the physical channel. Retailers n the physical chan-
nel can provide information about both digital and physicalattributes of products,
whereas retailers in the electronic channel can provide information only about dig-
ital attributes [66]. For example, if a consumer wants to purchase a new brand of
perfume, she can’t ascertain through the electronic channel wh ther she likes the
perfume, without examining it at a physical store. On the other hand, the product
information electronic retailers can provide for books is almost as rich as that pro-
vided by any physical retailer. Second, consumers’ search costs are significantly
reduced in the electronic channel [2, 59]. Reduced search costs in the electronic
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channel may enable consumers to receive product information from one channel
and then purchase from another channel for a lower price.1
The IS literature has examined the impact of reduced search cost on price
competition in the retail environment [9, 16, 23, 27, 98]. Empirical studies in this
area find substantial price dispersion. In general, electronic markets exhibit as much
price dispersion as traditional markets.
There is also a literature that examines the interaction betwe n physical and
electronic channels [20, 21, 48, 87, 115]. For example, in Chen et al [20], con-
ventional retailers use the electronic retailer (i.e., theref rral intermediary) to price
discriminate between the price-sensitive consumers in theelectronic channel and
the retailer’s other customers. Similarly, Riggins [87] considers the difference in
the characteristics of electronic and conventional channel consumers, and shows
how the “digital divide” can be used by multi-channel retailers to achieve better
segmentation. Zettelmeyer [115] examines the competitionbetween two integrated
manufacturers who operate in both the channels. He finds thatw en the reach of
the Internet is high, neither firm provides information in the conventional channel,
and only one of the firms offers information in the electronicchannel. However,
in his model, both channels have the same ability to offer product information, and
consumers incur the same search cost in both channels. The differ nce between the
two channels is that the electronic channel incurs a much lower (zero) marginal cost
of offering information.
1In one survey [92], 66 percent of the consumers said that theybrowsed using one channel while
purchasing in another. Similarly, Ratchford, Lee, and Talukdar [86] show that about 39 percent of
the respondents used the Internet to get information beforethey purchased vehicles from dealers.
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The objective of this study is to examine the manufacturers’di tribution
problem in an environment where product information is important for consumers
to identify their ideal product, and there are two channel alt rnatives that have dif-
ferent search costs for and reach to consumers and differentcapabilities to provide
product information. A manufacturer’s distribution problem, then, is to choose a
distribution strategy that induces retailers to make pricing and information service
decisions that maximize the manufacturer’s profits. Specifically, this paper ex-
amines the impact of information technology on three key variables that impact
the functioning of markets: (i) consumers’ reduced search cost on the Internet, (ii)
increasing reach of the electronic channel, and (iii) the different types of product
information offered in different channels. In other words,given the different search
costs, reach, and information service capabilities acrossdifferent channels, when
should a manufacturer sell through the physical channel, thelectronic channel, or
both the channels?
This study differs from the extant literature in four importan ways. First,
the IS literature has examined retailers’ price competition in the electronic chan-
nel [9, 10, 11, 16]. In contrast, this paper focuses on the impact of reduced search
cost on manufacturers’ distribution strategy. Second, as discussed above, a key
role of the market is to provide product information to enable consumers to iden-
tify their ideal product. This paper differs from the distribution channel literature
as it examines the manufacturer’s distribution strategy inan environment where
product information is important for consumers to identifyheir ideal product, and
different channels have different capabilities to provideproduct information. Third,
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the IS literature on information provision focuses on information that can be deliv-
ered electronically [10, 11, 35]. In this paper we divide product information into
two parts: information about physical attributes and information about digital at-
tributes. We examine how the two types of information influence manufacturers’
and retailers’ decisions. Finally, the literature examining the interaction between
physical and electronic channels focuses on how the characteristics of consumers
in the electronic channel can be used to achieve more efficient price-discrimination
and segmentation [87]. In contrast, this paper examines howt e informational char-
acteristics of the product affect a manufacturer’s distribu ion strategy.
This study has two main results. First, it shows that the manufact rer will de-
cide to add an electronic channel in addition to selling through the physical channel
either when product information is very valuable and product information is largely
about digital attributes, or when the product information is not valuable. Second,
when the reach of the electronic channel increases, it is notalways beneficial for the
manufacturer to sell through both the channels. In this enviro ment the manufac-
turer may sell only through the physical channel even thoughthe electronic channel
can provide a comparable level of information. Also, when the manufacturer sells
through both the channels, it need not sell through the most well-known electronic
retailer in the electronic channel. This paper also examines th environments where
the manufacturer has its own electronic store and where the retailer has stores on
both the channels (e.g., Circuit City and Circuitcity.com).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The assumptions of the model
and the timing of the game are described in section two. Section three presents the
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equilibrium. The results of the analyses are presented in section four, and section
five discusses some extensions. The limitations of the modelare discussed in sec-
tion six. Section seven concludes the chapter.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Assumptions
A manufacturer produces two horizontally differentiated products at a constant
marginal cost, which is assumed to be zero without loss of generality. The man-
ufacturer can sell to consumers through independent retailers in the physical (con-
ventional) channel, or the electronic channel, or both. There are two independent
retailers, retailer C and retailer E,2 that operate in the physical (conventional) and
the electronic channel, respectively. Each retailer sellsboth products, if it sells. The
model is symmetrical in the following sense. Each of the two products perfectly fits
half of the consumers where each consumer purchases only onepr duct, and has
a unit demand for that product. However, consumers need product information to
identify their ideal product. Each consumer receives a utility of 8h from consum-
ing her ideal product and a utility of8l (8l < 8h) from consuming the non-ideal
product.3 This setup is similar to Lal and Sarvary [66] except for the fact that here
2The duopoly environment is commonly used in the literature.This also reflects our interest in
the interaction between the two channels. That there is onlye retailer in each channel does not
mean that the manufacturer chooses only one retailer in eachchannel. For example, in the physical
market, the manufacturer may divide the market into severalexclusive territories (e.g., in terms of
geography), and in each territory it may choose one retailer. The duopoly model is also applicable
to this environment. Please see section 6 for further discussion on this issue.
3In this paper, for ease of exposition, we use ideal/non-ideal products to explain how informa-
tion increases consumers’ expected utility. Of course, information can increase consumers’ expected
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each retailer sells the same set of products.
Product information consists of two parts: information about physical char-
acteristics and information about digital characteristics.4 Product information helps
consumers to identify their ideal product. With full information (i.e., information
about both characteristics), consumers can identify theirid al product with a high
probability θh and get an expected utility ofR = 8hθh + 8l (1 − θh). Without
any product information, consumers can only choose their idal product with a low
probabilityθl (θl < θh), and if they purchase, they get an expected utility ofr < R
(r = 8hθl +8l (1− θl )). With only part of the product information, consumers can
identify their ideal product with a probability betweenθl andθh and get an expected
utility betweenr andR.5
It is assumed that each retailer can decide whether to provide product in-
formation. In different channels product information is provided to consumers in
different ways. In the physical channel product information s provided via prod-
uct demonstrations, trials and test-drives, and face-to-face communication. To offer
product information, the retailer in the physical channel incurs a (periodic) fixed
cost ofVC (e.g., to build show rooms and stock products, to train its salespersons to
demonstrate products and answer questions, and so on). Retailers in the electronic
channel do not need to incur such costs and only post information bout digital
utility in other ways. For example, consumers can get higherexpected utility by receiving informa-
tion about how to use and maintain a product. Our results holdas long as information increases
consumers’ expected utility, no matter how many products the manufacturer makes and retailers
carry.
4Digital characteristics are attributes that can be communicated through text, pictures, and sound.
Physical characteristics are attributes that can only be communicated through touch, taste, and smell.
58h, 8l , θh, andθl are used to derive the expected utilities,R andr . The rest of the model is
developed in terms ofR andr . 8h, 8l , θh, andθl are not used in the paper any further.
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attributes on their web sites. The cost of providing productinformation in the elec-
tronic channel,VE, is therefore very low compared withVC. However, the retailer
in the physical channel can offer information about both physical and digital char-
acteristics, whereas the retailer in the electronic channel cannot offer information
about physical characteristics (please see Lal and Sarvary[66] page 487-488 for an
excellent discussion about the difference in information service provision between
the two channels). Therefore, the retailer in the electronic channel is only able
to provide consumers with information about digital characteristics of the product.
With information about digital characteristics only, consumers get an expected util-
ity of RD (r < RD < R).
The mass of consumers is normalized to 1, without loss of generality.6 Con-
sumers incur a positive search costKC in the physical channel. In the electronic
channel their search cost,KE, is greatly reduced. The search cost in the physical
channel is the transportation cost of visiting the physicalretailer, whereas the search
cost in the electronic channel is the cost of identifying andreaching the electronic
store’s web site. For expositional simplicity we assume that e cost of providing
product information for the electronic retailer,VE, and the consumers’ search cost
in the electronic channel,KE, are zero.7 However, consumers are heterogeneous in
terms of their willingness to transact through the two channels. It is assumed that
all the consumers can purchase through the physical channel. However, a fraction
6In this setup the number of consumers and the demand is fixed. However, we have solved the
case where this assumption is relaxed. The results in this paper are invariant to this assumption.
7This assumption implies that if both the channels are chosen, retailer E will always provide
product information. However, we have solved the model where r tailer E incurs a positive cost
to provide product information, and consumers incur a cost tvisit the electronic retailer. All the
results in this paper remain valid in that model.
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β of these consumers also consider transacting through the electronic channel. We
refer to these consumers who can purchase at both the channels as multi-channel
consumers. This implies that a proportion 1− β of consumers can only purchase
through retailer C.8 We refer to these consumers as physical-channel consumers.9
It is also assumed that a retailer cannot price discriminateagainst consumers on the
basis of their access to different channels.
2.2.2 Sequence of Moves
This is a three-stage game. Figure 2.1 shows the sequence of moves in the game. In
stage 1, the manufacturer decides the channel structure. That is, it chooses whether
to sell through retailer C only or through both the retailers.10 Then the manufac-
turer decides the price structure to charge to the retailer(s). It is assumed that the
manufacturer adopts a two-part tariff [56, 58, 60, 79, 104] consisting of a wholesale
price PM and a fixed feeW. According to the Robinson-Patman Act, the manu-
facturer should treat the retailers uniformly. Thus, the manuf cturer is “prevented
from giving different terms to different retailers in the same retailer class (discoun-
8These consumers do not purchase in the electronic channel. Th re may be several reasons for
this. For example, they may have no access to the Internet, they may not know the electronic store’s
location on the web, or they may not feel secure about purchasing through the electronic channel.
US Census Bureau [93] statistics suggest that E-Commerce sales constitute less than 3 percent of
retail sales.
9Here it is assumed that the physical retailer reaches every consumer in its market (or its exclusive
territory). We do not consider consumers who can transact only through the electronic channel, as
this proportion may be very low. Adding this category of consumers only adds to the complexity
of the model without adding any new insights. The results in th s paper are attributable to the
consumers who can purchase from both the channels. Please see ction 6 for further discussion on
this issue.
10 Later in the paper we also consider the alternative of choosing retailer E only, and the alternative
of the manufacturer itself selling through the electronic channel.
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ters, merchandisers, etc.), unless these reflect correspondent cost differences.” In
this model, it is assumed that the manufacturer incurs the same cost to sell to the
two retailers, and as a result, the manufacturer cannot discriminate between the re-
tailers by charging them different fixed fees or different wholesale prices. It is also
assumed that the manufacturer has little control over the retailers’ information ser-
vice strategy, i.e., it is expensive for the manufacturer towrite and enforce contracts



























Figure 2.1: Sequence of Moves
Retailers accept any contract that gives them a non-negativeprofit. Once
the channel structure is determined, retailers move in the next two stages. In stage
2, retailers decide whether to provide product information. I stage 3, they set
their prices. LetPC (PE) be the price charged by retailer C (retailer E). This two-
stage game for retailers is introduced because the information provision decision
has greater commitment attached to it, whereas pricing decisions can be more eas-
ily changed [58].11 Once retailers set their prices, their information provision and
11For example, in the physical channel, to provide product information a store has to invest in
well-stocked showrooms and hire and train knowledgeable salespersons. In contrast to these com-
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pricing decisions become known to consumers. Consumers thenchoose their search
strategies to maximize their surplus. For example, if one retailer provides product
information and the other doesn’t, then consumers who can purchase at both the
channels have many choices. They may purchase directly fromthe information
service provider, or they may purchase directly from the non-service provider for
a lower search cost or lower price but get a lower expected utility, or they may
receive product information at the information service provider and then purchase
from another retailer for a lower price.
2.3 The Market Equilibrium
The manufacturer has two choices: sell through retailer C only, r sell through both
the channels. LetπCM be the manufacturer’s profit if it chooses retailer C only,
andπbothM if it chooses both the channels. If the manufacturer choosesretailer C
only, retailer C has monopoly over all the consumers. Each consumer receives a
surplus ofR − KC − PC if retailer C provides product information, and a surplus
of r − KC − PC if retailer C doesn’t provide product information. As a result,
if retailer C provides product information, it chargesR − KC and sells to every
consumer. Retailer C’s profits are thenπC = (R − KC − PM) − W − VC. On
the other hand, if retailer C doesn’t provide product information, it chargesr − KC
and makes a profit ofπ ′C = (r − KC − PM) − W. Therefore, if the manufacturer
chooses to sell through retailer C only, retailer C will provide product information
mitments that are costly to make (and once made, costly to revers ), the pricing decisions can be
more easily changed.
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if πC ≥ π ′C (that is if, R − r ≥ VC) and will not provide product information
otherwise. The manufacturer’s strategy is to choose a wholesale price and a fixed
fee to maximize its profits. For example, the manufacturer may chargeW = 0 and
PM = R − KC − VC when R − r ≥ VC, and chargeW = 0 andPM = r − KC





R − KC − VC if R − r ≥ VC
r − KC if R − r < VC
(2.1)
The subsequent analysis focuses on the cases where both the cannels are chosen.
As is apparent here, subgame perfection is the appropriate solution concept in this
game. Therefore, we identify the equilibrium behavior using backward induction
i.e., we first specify consumers’ search strategy, followedby retailers’ pricing and
service strategy, and finally the manufacturer’s pricing and channel strategy.
2.3.1 Consumers’ Search Strategy
Once retailers’ product information and pricing strategies are set, consumers choose
their search strategy based on their search cost, and the pricing and information ser-
vice strategies of the retailers. LetUC(UE) be the utility of purchasing the product
if a consumer receives product information from retailer C (retailer E).UC is R
when retailer C provides product information andr when retailer C doesn’t pro-
vide product information. Similarly,UE is RD when retailer E provides product
information andr when it doesn’t.
12This is one of the many optimal solutions that maximizes the manufacturer’s profits.
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A consumer who can purchase only at the physical channel receives a sur-
plus of UC − KC − PC from purchasing from retailer C. If this surplus is non-
negative the consumer purchases from retailer C. A multi-channel consumer may
have four alternative search strategies. She can get a surplu of UC − KC − PC
if she receives product information from retailer C and purchases from retailer C,
and a surplus ofUE − PE if she receives product information from retailer E and
purchases from retailer E. These two search strategies do not involve free riding.
In the third strategy, a multi-channel consumer can get a surplus of UC −
KC − PE if she receives product information from retailer C and purchases from
retailer E. Note that this free-riding strategy is considere only when retailer C pro-
vides more valuable product information. The benefit of freeriding is that a higher
level of product information allows the consumer to identify her ideal product with
a higher probability. However, if retailer C doesn’t provide product information,
there is no need for a multi-channel consumer to free-ride byvisiting retailer C first
and then purchasing from retailer E. The consumer will be better off purchasing
directly from retailer E.
A multi-channel consumer’s fourth choice is to visit retailer E for product
information and then purchase from retailer C, and get a surplus of UE − KC −
PC. Note that this free-riding strategy is considered only when retailer E provides
product information but retailer C doesn’t. A multi-channel consumer chooses her
search strategy from the four alternatives to maximize her surplus.
Each retailer decides its information service and pricing strategy to maxi-
mize its expected profits. The above analysis shows that the higher theUE, the
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more likely that multi-channel consumers will purchase from retailer E. In other
words, providing product information doesn’t decrease demand. As it is assumed
that the cost of providing product information in the electronic channel is zero,
retailer E always provides product information andUE = RD. Given retailers’
information service and pricing strategies, consumers mayfollow different search
strategies giving rise to different equilibria. The different cases when both the re-
tailers are chosen are examined below.
When both retailers provide product information, a multi-channel consumer
receives an expected utility ofR from purchasing the product if she receives the
product information from the physical retailer. She receives a utility of RD < R
if she receives the product information from the electronicretailer. This difference
in the utility received is determined by where she receives th product information,
not by where she purchases the product. In this case a multi-channel consumer has
three choices: (1) visit and purchase from retailer C, (2) visit and purchase from
retailer E, and (3) free ride by visiting retailer C and then purchasing from retailer
E (it can be easily shown that in this particular case purchasing directly from retailer
C dominates visiting retailer E and then purchasing from retail r C).
Case 1 When both retailers provide product information andR − RD ≤
KC, the strategy of purchasing directly from retailer E dominates the free-riding
strategy of visiting retailer C and then purchasing from retail r E. The reason is that
the surplus from the free riding strategy isR− KC − PE. Given thatR− RD ≤ KC,
this surplus (i.e.,R− KC − PE) is less than the surplus ofRD − PE from purchasing
directly from retailer E. Therefore, there is no free ridingthis case. The intuition
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is that when the value of information about physical characteristics (R − RD) is
lower than the cost of receiving it (KC), a multi-channel consumer has no incentive
to incur the search cost to free ride. As a result, she visits at most one store. She
purchases from retailer C ifR− PC − KC > RD − PE and purchases from retailer
E otherwise. This case is referred to as Case 1.
Case 2 When both the retailers provide product information andR−RD >
KC, a multi-channel consumer always first visits retailer C forfull product informa-
tion. The reason is that in this case the surplus from free riding by visiting retailer C
first and then purchasing from retailer E isR− KC − PE. SinceR− RD > KC, this
surplus (i.e.,R − KC − PE) is greater than the surplus ofRD − PE from purchas-
ing directly from retailer E. After visiting retailer C for full product information, a
multi-channel consumer purchases from retailer C ifPC ≤ PE and purchases from
retailer E otherwise. The intuition is that when the value ofinformation about phys-
ical characteristics (R − RD) is greater than the cost of receiving it (KC), a multi-
channel consumer will always get the information. Therefor, the multi-channel
consumer is likely to free-ride in this case. This case is refer d to as Case 2.
Case 3 In the next case, when the manufacturer chooses both the retail s,
only retailer E provides product information, i.e.,UC = r , andUE = RD. As the
search cost in the electronic channel is zero, a multi-channel consumer will always
first visit retailer E for information about digital characteristics, as the surplus from
purchasing from retailer C after receiving the product information from retailer E is
always greater than the surplus from purchasing directly from etailer C. Therefore,
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the multi-channel consumer is likely to free-ride in this cae. The consumer receives
a surplus ofRD−PE if she purchases from retailer E, and a surplus ofRD−KC−PC
if she purchases from retailer C. The consumer will purchase from retailer C if
PE − PC > KC and from retailer E otherwise. This case is referred to as Case3.
As stated earlier, if the cost of providing product information (VE) and the
search cost (KE) in the electronic channel are positive, retailer E may not pr vide
product information under some circumstances. As a result,additional cases arise in
such an environment. For example, there may be a case where noretailer provides
product information when the manufacturer chooses both thechannels. However,
including these additional cases makes the model more complex without changing
any results or adding new insights.
In sum, the physical-channel consumer who can purchase onlythrough the
physical retailer always purchases, as long as she receivesa non-negative surplus.
As stated above, the multi-channel consumer needs to decidewhere to receive prod-
uct information, and where to purchase. The multi-channel consumer will purchase
from retailer C ifPE > PC +g, whereg can be described as the electronic retailer’s
price premium. This price premium reflects retailer E’s advantage in search cost
and its disadvantage in the product information it can offerto consumers. There-
fore, g is contingent onUC (either R or r ), RD, and KC. In case 1, where both
retailers provide product information,R − RD ≤ KC, and there is no free riding,
g is KC − (R − RD). In case 2, where both retailers provide product information
but R − RD > KC, the multi-channel consumer will always first visit retailer C
for product information. Retailer E then must offer a discount so thatPE is below
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Table 2.1: Case Description and retailer E’s Price Premium
Case # Case Description UC g
Case 1 Both retailers provide information and
R − RD ≤ KC
R KC − (R − RD)
Case 2 Both retailers provide information and
R − RD > KC
R 0−
Case 3 Only retailer E provides information r KC
PC, otherwise no consumer will purchase from retailer E. Therefore, in this caseg
would be 0−(i.e., negative and infinitely close to zero), which means that retailer C
has a small price premium over retailer E. In case 3 where onlyretailer E provides
product information, the multi-channel consumer will always first visit retailer E
for product information. Retailer E can then prevent these consumers from free
riding by chargingPE < PC + KC. Therefore, in this caseg would beKC. Table
2.1 shows retailer C’s information service level and retailer E’s price premium in
different cases
2.3.2 Stage 3: Retailers’ Pricing Strategy
As stated earlier, after both retailers decide their information service strategy the
price premium of retailer E over retailer C,g is determined. The multi-channel
consumer purchases from retailer C ifPE > PC + g and purchases from retailer
E otherwise. Of course, the physical-channel consumer can only purchase from
retailer C. This type of price competition has been studied inthe literature on price
promotions [81, 84]. One common result in this literature isthat there is no focal
pure-strategy equilibrium, thus, mixed-strategy equilibrium has to be considered.
The intuition is that if one retailer charges a fixed price, another retailer will have
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an incentive to slightly lower its price and sell to all the multi-channel consumers. In
the mixed-strategy equilibrium each retailer chooses its pr ce from its equilibrium
price distribution, and it receives the same expected profits by charging any price in
the support of the distribution. Mixed strategy is interpreted as price promotion in
the theory literature and as price dispersion in empirical studies [97]. LetFC(p) and
FE(p) be the equilibrium (cumulative) price distribution function of the physical
and the electronic retailer.
Proposition 2.1 When both the channels are chosen the two retailers’ price distri-
bution function and profits are as shown below:









(1 − β)(UC − KC − PM)
p − g − PM
]








(1 − β)(UC − KC − PM) + g
p + g − PM
when p< UC − KC
1 otherwise
(2.3)




EπC = (1 − β)(UC − KC − PM) − W − vC
EπE = β[(1 − β)(UC − KC − PM) + g] − W
(2.4)
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Table 2.2: Retailers’ Expected Profits in Different Cases
Case # Retailers’ Expected Profits
Case 1
EπC1 = (1 − β)(R − KC − PM) − W − VC
EπE1 = β[(1 − β)(R − KC − PM) + KC − R + Rd] − W
Case 2
EπC2 = (1 − β)(R − KC − PM) − W − VC
EπE2 = β[(1 − β)(R − KC − PM)] − W
Case 3
EπC3 = (1 − β)(r − KC − PM) − W
EπE3 = β[(1 − β)(r − KC − PM) + KC] − W
WherevC is VC if retailer C provides product information, and 0 if it doesn’t.
All the proofs are in the appendix. Equation 2.4 shows retailrs’ profit functions in
the general case. For each specific case, retailers’ profit func ions are calculated by
substituting specificg andUC (shown in Table 1) into the general case (Equation
2.4), and are shown in Table 2.2. For convenience, we use the following notation
for the retailers’ profits under different cases.
2.3.3 Stage 2: Retailers’ Information Service Strategy
This section answers the question: if the manufacturer chooses both the channels,
who will provide product information to consumers? As retail r E always provides
product information, only retailer C has to decide whether to provide product in-
formation. As a result, there are two possible outcomes in this stage: (i) both offer
product information, or (ii) retailer E alone offers product information. Retailer C’s
information service strategy would depend on its profit function in each situation.
Given that retailer E provides product information, if retailer C provides product
information, its profit would beEπC1 = EπC2 (shown in Table 2). If it doesn’t
provide product information, its profit would beEπC3. Therefore, given that re-
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tailer E provides product information, for retailer C to provide product information,
we should haveEπC1 ≥ EπC3, i.e.,
(1 − β)(R − r ) ≥ VC (2.5)
In sum, if (1 − β)(R − r ) ≥ VC andR − RD < KC, the competition is in
case 1. If(1 − β)(R − r ) ≥ VC and R − RD ≥ KC, the competition is in case
2. If (1 − β)(R − r ) < VC, only retailer E provides product information, and the
competition is in case 3.
2.3.4 Stage 1: The Manufacturer’s Choice of Distribution Struc-
ture
The manufacturer chooses a distribution structure that maxi izes its profits. The
manufacturer’s profits consist of two parts: wholesale price and the fixed fee. After
the channel structure is chosen, the manufacturer needs to choose a wholesale price
and a fixed fee to maximize its profits. If only one retailer is chosen, as discussed
earlier, the manufacturer can easily appropriate the totalch nnel profits. However,
when both the retailers are chosen, the competition is asymmetric; different retailers
have different revenues and different costs of providing information service. There-
fore, the manufacturer may not be able to appropriate all thechannel profits. The
manufacturer’s profits and the structure of the two-part tariff when it chooses both
the retailers are as follows:
Proposition 2.2 The manufacturer’s profit and its profit-maximizing price and fixed
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πbothM = UC − KC +
βg + vC
(1 − β)2
(1 − 2β) − 2vC






It is clear that the manufacturer will choose both the retailrs when adding
the electronic channel in addition to selling through the physical channel increases
its profits, i.e., whenπbothM > π
C
M . From equations (2.1) and (2.6) and table 1, we
have the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3 The manufacturer will choose both the retailers ifβ < 0.5 and
one of the following conditions holds:
(A) R− RD < KC −
βVC
1 − 2β
and R− r ≥
VC
1 − β
(B) R− r < VC + KC
β(1 − 2β)
(1 − β)2
and VC ≤ R − r <
VC
1 − β
(C) R− r < VC
(2.7)
These conditions are shown in Figure 2.2. They are discussedin the follow-
ing section.
2.4 Analysis of the Equilibrium
The manufacturer has two choices for its vertical structure: to choose retailer C
only, or to choose both the retailers. In this section we discus the forces that
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influence the manufacturer’s distribution strategy. The electronic channel has ad-
vantages and disadvantages compared with the physical channel. Consumers may
have a higher willingness to pay in the electronic channel than in the physical chan-
nel, as they incur a lower search cost in the electronic channel. On the other hand,
the electronic channel can only provide information about the digital characteris-
tics. This may decrease consumers’ willingness to pay in theelectronic channel.
When choosing the distribution structure, the manufacturerne ds to consider the
value of information about digital characteristics (RD − r ), the value of informa-
tion about physical characteristics (R − RD), search cost (KC), and the proportion
of multi-channel consumers (β). If both the channels are chosen, these parameters
have two effects on the manufacturer’s profits. First, as indicated above, they in-
fluence the manufacturer’s profits by influencing consumers’willingness to pay in
each channel. Second, they determine the manufacturer’s profits by influencing the
price competition between the two channels, which determines the retailers’ profits
and thereby the price that the manufacturer can charge the retaile s. Next, we ex-
amine the price competition between the two retailers when both the channels are
chosen.
2.4.1 Price Competition Between the Two Channels
Lemma 2.1 As the electronic retailer’s price premium (g) increases, the manufac-
turer is more likely to sell through both the channels.
It is clear that the manufacturer adds the electronic channel, in addition to
selling through the physical channel, when the addition of anew retail channel
48
increases its profits. Intuitively, the manufacturer wouldadd the electronic retailer
when some consumers are willing to pay a higher price in the electronic channel
compared with what they pay in the physical channel when the manufacturer sells
only through the physical retailer.13 This may happen when the subgame is in case
1 or in case 3.
When only retailer C is chosen, it charges the monopoly price.When both
the channels are chosen, the two retailers compete for the multi-channel consumers,
although retailer C still has monopoly over the physical-channel consumers. In the
equilibrium price distributions, for any pricep, F(p) is the probability that the
retailer charges a price equal to or lower thanp. FromFC(p) andFE(p) in Propo-
sition 2.1, it is straightforward that asg, retailer E’s price premium over retailer C,
increases, bothFC(p) andFE(p) decrease. This implies that when retailer E has a
large price premium over retailer C, both retailers are less likely to engage in price
competition, i.e., they are more likely to charge higher prices.
The intuition for this result is that when retailer E has a large price premium
over retailer C (i.e., the electronic channel’s advantage in search cost is much larger
than its disadvantage in the information service level), retail r C has to lower its
price significantly to attract the multi-channel consumers. However, because re-
tailer C cannot discriminate between the two types of consumers, it ends up charg-
ing a much reduced price to the physical-channel consumers,which may reduce its
total profits. For retailer C, the higher the electronic retail r’s price premium, the
13This model focuses on the demand side variables that are influnced by IT. The results of the
model are about the impact of the nature of product information, and consumers’ willingness to
purchase from the electronic channel, on retail competition and on the manufacturer’s distribution
strategy, other things being equal.
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greater the decrease in its revenue from selling to its physical-channel consumers,
when it competes for the multi-channel consumers. This lowers the physical re-
tailer’s incentive to compete for the multi-channel consumers. If retailer C has less
incentive to engage in price competition, retailer E of course would be more likely
to charge higher prices to the multi-channel consumers. Therefore, price competi-
tion is reduced when retailer E has a significant price premium over retailer C. This
increases channel profits, and the manufacturer’s profits from choosing both the
retailers are higher than when only retailer C is chosen. Therefore, when retailer
E’s price premium is such that retailer C would rather largely concentrate on the
physical-channel consumers where it has a monopoly, and retailer E charges a high
price to the multi-channel consumers, the manufacturer is more likely to choose
both the channels instead of selling through retailer C only.
Type of Products and the Value of Product Information
Result 2.1 When the value of product information is high, as the value ofinf rma-
tion about digital characteristics increases, the manufacturer is more likely to sell
through both the channels.
This result is illustrated using Figure 2.2. The X-axis represents the value of
information about physical characteristics,R − RD, and the Y-axis represents the
value of information about digital characteristics,RD − r . Any point on this graph
represents a specific product category. If the point moves rightward, the value of
information about physical characteristics increases; ifthe point moves upward, the



























Figure 2.2: Channel Choice
diagonally from bottom left, the value of full information icreases. The shaded
regions represent conditions under which the manufacturerwill sell through both
the channels.
In the regions above the line AB that includes regions I, II, and III, the value
of full information is high.14 Specifically, in region I the value of full information
is high, however, the product characteristics are primarily digital in nature. In this
region, if both the retailers are chosen, both provide product information and there
is no free riding. Here retailer E has a significant price premium as it can provide
14From Figure 2.2, it is clear that for any point above the line AB, the value of full information
(R − r = (R − RD) + (RD − r )) is greater thanVC/(1 − β). For any point below the line AB,
R − r < VC/(1 − β).
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a comparable level of product information but has an advantage in search cost. In
this region, if the manufacturer chooses both the retailers, r tailer C charges the
physical-channel consumers close to its monopoly price, and retailer E charges the
multi-channel consumers a higher price. Therefore, in thisregion the manufacturer
will sell through both the channels. This happens in case 1. The condition set (A)
in proposition 2.3 defines this region. Products such as branded desktop computers
are an example of products in this region.
In region II product information is very valuable but information is increas-
ingly about physical characteristics asR − RD increases. In this region the elec-
tronic retailer’s advantage in search cost is comparable toits disadvantage in the
provision of product information. If the manufacturer chooses both the channels,
even though there is no free riding, it will result in aggressive price competition be-
tween the two retailers. Therefore, the manufacturer will not choose to sell through
both the retailers in this region. This region also falls in case 1.
In region III information about physical characteristicsR− RD, is very valu-
able. In this region every multi-channel consumer visits reail r C first, and retailer
E only sells to those consumers who, after visiting retailerC for full information,
visit and purchase from retailer E at a lower price. In this cae, since retailer E’s
price premium is negative (0−), it is clear that price competition between the two
retailers would be very severe. Specifically, in this case, retailer E has to charge
below R − KC to induce consumers to free-ride and purchase from retailerE. This
would also cause retailer C to charge a lower price and charging its regular/high
price, R − KC, has a lower probability. On the other hand, if only retailer Cis
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chosen, it always chargesR − KC. As a result, the total channel profits when both
retailers are chosen would be lower than when only retailer Cis chosen. Therefore,
in this region, the manufacturer will only sell through retailer C. This happens in
case 2. New brands of perfume are examples of products in thisregion.
Result 2.2 When the value of full information is low, the manufacturer will sell
through both the channels. When the value of full information is intermediate, the
manufacturer will sell through retailer C only.
This result can also be illustrated using Figure 2.2. In the region OAB the
subgame is in case 3. In this region, if the manufacturer wereto choose to sell
through both the retailers, as suggested by Equation 2.5, retailer C will not pro-
vide product information. However, in this region, if the manufacturer were to sell
through the physical retailer only, since the physical retail r would be a monopo-
list, as suggested by Equation 2.1, it may provide product information and charge
a higher price. In other words, choosing only retailer C provides the manufacturer
the likely benefit of full information. On the other hand, in this region, retailer E
has a price premium ofKC. Therefore, in the OAB region, the manufacturer trades
off the benefit of full information from retailer C when retailer C is the only retailer
chosen, against the benefit from the electronic retailer’s price premium when both
the retailers are chosen.
In region V and VI product information is not valuable and themanufacturer
prefers the benefit of the electronic retailer’s price premiu over the benefit from
the physical retailer’s product information. Therefore, in this region the manufac-
turer sells through both retailers, even though the multi-channel consumers may
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free-ride by visiting retailer E and then purchasing from retail r C. The condition
sets (B & C) in Proposition 2.3 define this region. Products such as music CDs and
computer accessories are examples of products in this region.
In region IV product information is moderately valuable. Inthis region the
manufacturer prefers the benefit of the physical retailer’sproduct information when
retailer C is the only retailer, over the electronic retailer’s price premium ofKC
when both the retailers are chosen. Therefore, in this region the manufacturer will
sell through retailer C only. Products such as clothing/apparel are examples of
products in this region.
In summary, the manufacturer will choose both the channels when retailer
E has a high price premium. This happens when full information is very valuable
and product information is largely about digital characteristics. This implies that
as technology enables the electronic channel to provide improved product infor-
mation, more and more products will fall into region I, and the manufacturer will
be more likely to sell through both channels. The manufacturer will also choose
both the channels when full information is not valuable. In both the above situa-
tions the manufacturer gets higher profits by making use of the electronic channel’s
advantage in search cost. A manufacturer will sell only through retailer C, if the
product has very valuable physical characteristics, or when product information is
only moderately valuable.
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2.4.2 The Proportion of Multi-Channel Consumers (β)
Result 2.3 Whenβ is below a certain value, with an increase inβ the manufac-
turer is more likely to sell through both the channels. Whenβ is above a certain
value, with an increase inβ, the manufacturer is less likely to sell through both the
channels.
From Equation 2.6, it can be shown that whenβ, the proportion of multi-
channel consumers, is belowβ∗ = g/(3g + 2vC), πbothM increases asβ increases.
In other words, when there are a small proportion of multi-channel consumers, the
manufacturer is more likely to choose both the channels whenβ increases. But
whenβ is aboveg/(3g + 2vC), πbothM decreases asβ increases, which means that
the manufacturer is less likely to choose both the channels.
Whenβ increases, more consumers may purchase from the electronicchan-
nel. However,β also has an impact on price competition. From proposition 1,
it is clear that the higher the value ofβ, the higher the probability that the two
retailers will charge a lower price. Whenβ is low, retailer C would rather con-
centrate on charging a higher price to the physical-channelconsumers where it has
a monopoly, instead of competing aggressively to sell to thesmall proportion of
multi-channel consumers. Since retailer C does not competeaggressively for the
multi-channel consumers, the electronic retailer is able to charge a higher price to
these consumers. As a result, multi-channel consumers are more likely to purchase
from the electronic channel at a higher price. This increases channel profits. In this
circumstance, an increase inβ increases the likelihood that both the channels would
be chosen. However, when there are a large proportion of multi-channel consumers,
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the physical retailer cannot ignore these consumers, and the price competition be-
tween the channels is more aggressive. That is, whenβ is high, retailer C will price
aggressively to compete for the multi-channel consumers, rathe than concentrate
on the smaller proportion of physical-channel consumers where it has a monopoly.
This price competition will decrease channel profits. In such an environment, the
manufacturer is less likely to choose both the channels.
Profits




Figure 2.3: Impact ofβ on Manufacturer’s Profits.
This result is illustrated in Figure 2.3. Whenβ is belowβ∗, πbothM increases
with an increase inβ, and the manufacturer is likely to sell through both the chan-
nels. However, beyondβ∗, πbothM decreases with an increase inβ, and the manu-
facturer is less likely to sell through both the retailers. This suggests that thoughβ
is expected to increase as Internet technology diffuses further, it is not necessarily
beneficial for the manufacturer to always sell through both the channels.
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β is the proportion of consumers who are willing to transact through the
electronic channel. However, it is likely that there are many electronic retailers for
the manufacturer to choose from. In this regard, it is possible that consumers’ will-
ingness to transact through the electronic channel differsac oss different retailers,
i.e., each electronic retailer may have a uniqueβ. This difference in the willingness
to transact through different electronic retailers may be du to varying levels of trust
for different electronic retailers. As there are differencs in familiarity and expe-
riences with, and reputation of, different electronic retail rs, consumers may have
a different willingness to transact through each electronic retailer. For example,
in the Book industry, Amazon.com, Textbookx.com, and Bookpool.c m may have
different levels ofβ.15 Therefore, when the manufacturer decides to sell through
the electronic channel, the manufacturer may have to choosefr m electronic retail-
ers with different levels ofβ. Here it is clear that the manufacturer need not choose
the electronic store with the highestβ; rather, it should choose the electronic store
whoseβ is equal toβ∗.
When the Proportion of Multi-Channel Consumers Is Very High
Result 2.3.1 When the proportion of multi-channel consumers is very high, the
manufacturer will choose to sell through only one channel.
15For the manufacturer,β is the proportion of consumers who are willing to transact through the
electronic channel. On the other hand, each electronic retailer has a uniqueβ. These two definitions
of β are consistent.β for the manufacturer will be determined after the manufacturer chooses an
electronic retailer who has a specificβ. For example, assume that a fractionβ0 (β1) of consumers
are willing to purchase from Amazon.com (Bookpool.com). Here bothβ0 andβ1 are related to
specific stores. If the manufacturer chooses Amazon.com, thenβ for the manufacturer will beβ0.
In other words, a fractionβ = β0 of consumers are willing to purchase from the electronic channel
(if the electronic channel is chosen).
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When the proportion of multi-channel consumers is very high,if t e manu-
facturer were to choose both the channels, the price competition between the chan-
nels would be extremely high. Therefore, as is clear from proposition 2.3, whenβ
is sufficiently high the manufacturer will choose to sell through only one channel.
So far we have only compared choosing both the channels with choosing retailer C
only. However, whenβ is close to 1 the manufacturer may weigh the benefits of
choosing retailer C only against those of choosing retailerE only.
When retailer E is the only retailer, it will chargeRD, whereas when retailer
C is the only retailer, retailer C will chargeR − KC − VC if R − r > VC, or
charger − KC otherwise. Therefore, ifRD > max (R − KC − VC, r − KC), the
manufacturer will sell through retailer E only; otherwise,it will sell through retailer
C only. The interesting point here is that, for the manufacturer, the distribution
problem requires a consideration of both the channels only when some consumers
have access to only one channel. If all the consumers can purchase from both the
channels, the manufacturer may sell through only one channel.
2.5 Model Extensions
In this section we relax some of the assumptions of the model presented in sec-
tion two. So far it was assumed that the manufacturer and the two retailers in the
physical and the electronic channel are all independent of each other. In section 5.1
we examine the case where the manufacturer considers operating its own electronic
store instead of selling through an independent electronicstore. In section 5.2 we
examine the case where the physical and the electronic stores are jointly owned.
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2.5.1 Manufacturer Owns the Electronic Retailer
The Internet makes it easy for a manufacturer to have its own electronic store. Here
we examine the scenario where the manufacturer can itself oprate as the electronic
retailer, i.e., the manufacturer’s distribution decisions to sell through retailer C
only, or to choose retailer C and its own electronic store, orto sell through retailer
C and an independent electronic store. Specifically, we examine the manufacturer’s
distribution problem where it considers selling through the electronic channel itself,
but its own electronic store may have a differentβ compared with the independent
electronic retailer.
Result 2.4 If the manufacturer’sβ is close to the independent electronic retailer’s
β, the manufacturer should itself sell through the electronic channel. If the manu-
facturer’sβ is too low, or too high, compared with the independent electronic re-
tailer’s β, the manufacturer should sell through the independent electroni retailer
in the electronic channel.
In the original modelβ is the proportion of multi-channel consumers who
are willing to transact through the electronic channel. It is likely that the manu-
facturer’s electronic store can have a differentβ compared with the independent
electronic retailer. In such a situation it is interesting to examine whether the manu-
facturer should sell through its own electronic store or usean independent electronic
retailer.
Figure 2.4 shows the profits of the manufacturer when it itself i the elec-
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Figure 2.4: Manufacturer’s Own Electronic Store
manufacturer and the independent electronic retailer havethe sameβ, the manufac-
turer’s profits are always higher when it itself is the electronic retailer, because it
is in a better position to control the price competition across the channels. In other
words, given the physical retailer’s strategy, a manufacturer-owned electronic re-
tailer would make (e.g., pricing) decisions to maximize themanufacturer’s profits,
whereas an independent electronic retailer would make decisions to maximize its
own profits. Therefore, if the manufacturer’s own store and the independent elec-
tronic store have the sameβ, the manufacturer is better off selling through its own
electronic store rather than through the independent electroni store.
However, if the manufacturer and the independent electronic retailer have
different β, the picture is different. Assume that the independent electronic re-
tailer’s β is βE (please see Figure 2.4). When the manufacturer’sβ ( ayβM ) is
much lower than the independent electronic retailer’sβ (i.e., βM < βl ), a smaller
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proportion of consumers pay a higher price in the manufacturer’s electronic store,
compared to the proportion of consumers who are willing to purchase at a higher
price from the independent electronic retailer’s store. Similarly, when a larger pro-
portion of consumers can purchase at the manufacturer’s electronic store, compared
to those who are willing to transact through an independent electronic retailer’s
store (i.e.,βM > βh), the price competition between the channels is much higher
and the manufacturer’s profits are lower. Therefore, the manufacturer should itself
sell through the electronic channel when itsβ is close (i.e.,βl < βM < βh) to the
independent electronic retailer’sβ (βE), and not when itsβ is too low or too high
compared to the independent retailer’sβ.
When the manufacturer’sβ is very high, it is not profitable for the manufac-
turer to choose both the independent physical retailer and the manufacturer’s own
electronic store. The manufacturer may choose to sell only through its own elec-
tronic store, or sell through an independent physical retailer nd an independent
electronic retailer with moderateβ. However, the manufacturer may also have an-
other alternative, the manufacturer may consider operating its own physical store.
For example, Dell is well known for selling directly throughthe Internet. This im-
plies that Dell.com’sβ is so high that it has chosen to not sell through independent
physical retailers. To serve consumers who may not purchaseonline, Dell has set
up its own stores in large shopping malls [61].
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2.5.2 Integrated Retailers
So far it has been assumed that the retailers in the physical and the electronic chan-
nel are independent of each other and that they compete with each other. However,
the interaction between the two retailers could also be cooperative/complementary.
This can happen when the physical and the electronic retailers ar jointly owned.16
In this case there is no price competition between the two retailers.17 In this en-
vironment the higher theβ, the higher the channel profits, and the more likely the
manufacturer will sell through both the channels.
A manufacturer may also have to choose between two alternatives: (i) two
independent retailers in different channels, and (ii) one int grated retailer that oper-
ates in both the channels. It is clear that in this situation also the independent elec-
tronic retailer’sβ is likely to be different from the integrated retailer’sβ.18 In this
case if the integrated retailer’sβ is too low compared to the independent electronic
retailer’sβ, the manufacturer might not select the integrated retailerev n though
doing so will reduce free-riding and eliminate inter-channel price competition.
2.6 Discussion of the Model
In this section we discuss two limitations of the model. First, in the model the man-
ufacturer chooses only one retailer in each channel (i.e., th model does not consider
16For example, Circuit City owns physical stores as well as operates in the electronic channel
through Circuitcity.com. Similarly, Barnes & Noble operates stores in the physical and electronic
channels.
17Ancarani and Shannkar [4] find that integrated retailers charge higher average prices than inde-
pendent electronic retailers.
18For example, for consumer electronics, Circuitcity.com may h ve a lowerβ than Amazon.com.
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consumers who can purchase from two or more physical stores), as the emphasis
here is on price and service competition across the two channels. I an environment
where the manufacturer chooses two or more retailers in one channel, competition
exists not only across the two channels but also within each channel. The nature
of the competition within the same channel has been studied by Narasimhan [81].
For example, if there are two physical retailers (say, A and B)in the conventional
channel, there will be three types of consumers in the physical channel:
1) Consumers who have access to retailer A but not to retailer B
2) Consumers who have access to retailer B but not to retailer A
3) Consumers who have access to both retailer A and retailer B
Therefore, in the physical channel, the retailers will compete for consumers
who can purchase from both the retailers. On the other hand, if the electronic chan-
nel is introduced, each physical retailer will also competewi h the electronic retailer
for consumers who can purchase from the electronic retailernd that specific phys-
ical retailer. Such an environment may lead to aggressive competition between the
retailers in the physical and in the electronic channel. A more involved model may
be required to formally analyze this type of environment. However, it is not clear
whether such retail competition will benefit the manufacturer as it will reduce re-
tailers’ incentive to provide product information, and also reduce channel profits
and thus the manufacturer’s profits. Therefore, in the physical channel, if the man-
ufacturer chooses many retailers to cover more geographical are s, it may choose
physical retailers who are geographically apart from each other, to reduce the price
competition within the channel.
63
The second limitation of the model is the assumption that thephysical re-
tailer is able to reach all the consumers. This is largely true as the manufacturer
can choose one physical store in each retail market. However, on clear advantage
of the electronic retailer is that it can reach consumers wholive in very remote and
isolated areas. In other words, the physical retailer may onl reach a fractionλC
(λC < 1) of consumers. The remaining (i.e., 1−λC) consumers may have no access
to the physical retailer. If the manufacturer adds an electronic retailer, the electronic
retailer can independently reach a proportionβ of the consumers. Thus, if both the
channels are chosen, there will be four types of consumers:
1) Consumers who have access only to the physical retailer. Wecall them
physical-channel consumers. The mass of this type of consumers isλC(1 − β).
2) Consumers who have access only to the electronic retailer.Let’s call them
electronic-channel consumers. The mass of this type of consumers is(1 − λC)β.
3) Consumers who have access to both the retailers. We call them multi-
channel consumers. The mass of this type of consumers isλCβ.
4) Consumers who do not have access to any retailer. The mass ofthi type
of consumers is(1 − λC)(1 − β).
It may seem that the manufacturer should add the electronic channel because
the electronic retailer can reach electronic-channel consumers who do not have ac-
cess to the physical retailer, and the higher the electronicretailer’s ability to reach
new consumers, the better. However, this is not the case. Thereason is that as
the reach of the electronic retailer increases (i.e., asβ increases) the proportion
of electronic-channel consumers increases (i.e.,(1 − λC)β increases), but so does
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the proportion of multi-channel consumers (λCβ). This means that there are fewer
physical-channel consumers (i.e,λC(1 − β) decreases). As a result, the physical
retailer has more incentive to compete with the electronic retailer for multi-channel
consumers. In other words, the electronic retailer’s ability to reach more consumers
has two effects for the manufacturer.
1) The manufacturer can sell to new consumers. This has a positive impact
on the manufacturer’s profits.
2) The physical retailer competes more aggressively with the electronic re-
tailer for the multi-channel consumers. This has a negativeimpact on the manufac-
turer’s profits.
The analysis of the impact ofβ in the original model can also be applied to
this new model (where the physical retailer reachesλC (λC < 1) of consumers).
That is, whenβ is low, the proportion of multi-channel consumers is also low
and the physical retailer focuses on selling to physical-chnnel consumers, rather
than engaging in aggressive price competition with the electronic retailer for multi-
channel consumers. Therefore, the first (and the positive) eff ct dominates when
β is low. However, whenβ is high, the second (and the negative) effect domi-
nates. In this case the price competition between the two channels is very severe
and the manufacturer’s gain in selling to more new consumerscannot outweigh the
decrease in profits from selling to multi-channel consumersand physical-channel
consumers at a lower price. In sum, the results in the paper are not influenced by the
assumption that the physical retailer can reach all the consumers. In other words,
our results also hold when the electronic channel can reach new consumers.
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2.7 Conclusion
The Internet is an additional channel for manufacturers to provide information about
and sell their products. However, the electronic channel has properties that are dif-
ferent from the physical channel. In this paper we examine how information tech-
nology affects a monopoly manufacturer’s distribution problem. Specifically, the
paper examines how the introduction of the electronic channel, with its reduced
search cost and increasing reach but limited capability to provide product informa-
tion, influences the manufacturer’s distribution problem.Despite the reduced search
cost and increasing reach, the benefits of selling through bot the channels are re-
duced, and sometimes outweighed, by the free riding and the pric competition
between the two channels.
The model suggests that a manufacturer would sell through both the chan-
nels when the electronic store has a high price premium over the physical store. This
can happen when the product information is very valuable andthe product informa-
tion is largely digital in nature, or when the product information is not valuable.
This result is consistent with the empirical study by Carltonand Chevalier [18], in
which they find that the manufacturers’ channel selection decision is influenced by
the product category and whether the product is subject to free riding. The model
also suggests that when the manufacturer chooses to sell throug both the retailers,
there is an increase in price competition between the two channels. Therefore, when
the manufacturer sells through both the channels, it needs to select an electronic re-
tailer with the optimal reach, rather than selecting the most well-known electronic
retailer.
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This paper emphasizes the case where the retailers in the physical and the
electronic channel are independent retailers who compete with each other. A man-
ufacturer may be interested in using the physical channel and the electronic channel
in a complementary manner. This can happen when the physicalretailer also owns
the electronic retailer. Since the same retailer owns the physical and electronic
stores, they will not engage in aggressive price competition with each other, and
this can benefit the manufacturer if, as discussed in section5, theβ of the physi-
cal retailer’s electronic store is not too low compared to the β of the independent
electronic retailer.
This study suggests some interesting predictions that can be examined em-
pirically. For example, when product information is valuable and the product cat-
egory is such that the two channels provide very comparable levels of product in-
formation, the product is more likely to be available in boththe channels. In this
case the price competition between the channels is also expected to be reduced, and
the retailers are less likely to engage in frequent promotions. In this environment,
the price dispersion in each channel is expected to be low, but the average prices in
the two channels may be quite different. Similarly, the price competition between
the physical and the electronic retailers would be less severe if product information
is not valuable. It would also be interesting to empiricallyexamine the prediction
that a manufacturer is more likely to choose only one channelwh n, for a specific
product category, a very large proportion of the potential consumers have access to
both the channels.
In this paper we examined a market where the product categoryis new, there
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is no competition on the manufacturer’s side, and all the consumers need the prod-
uct information to identify their ideal product. The distribution problem would be
different in a more mature market where some consumers have already identified
their ideal product (and do not need the product information) and there are compet-
ing manufacturers. This is an interesting problem for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
To construct the mixed-strategy equilibrium for case 1, we have the follow-
ing properties:
(1) Each retailer’s price distribution (cumulative) is continuous.
(2) No retailer would have a mass point strictly below the highest value in
its price distribution.
(3) If retailer E’s price distribution (cumulative) has a mass point atP̃E,
retailer C will chargẽPE − g with zero density. If retailer C has a mass point atP̃C,
retailer E will chargẽPC + g with zero density.
(4) Retailer E’s price distribution is fromPE to R − KC + g. Retailer C’s
price distribution is fromPE−g to R − KC.
The proofs for these 4 propositions are essentially the sameas the proofs for
Propositions 2 to 5 in Narasimhan [81]. From now on, letPE be the lower bound
of retailer E’s price distribution.
From the propositions above, it can be easily shown that in case 1, retailer
C has a mass point atR − KC. Retailer E does not have a mass point in its price
distribution. This is also proved in Narasimhan [81]. Thus,when retailer C charges
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its highest price, it sells only to consumers who purchase only from the physical
channel, and when retailer E charges its highest price, it can sell to multi-channel
consumers only when retailer C chargesR − KC.
We then derive the two retailers’ profit functions in case 1. From the above
propositions, we know that the support of retailer C’s price distribution is [PE−g,
R − KC], and that for retailer E is [PE, R − KC + g). Here PE and prob(pC =
R − KC) are to be determined. Letδ be the probability that retailer C charges
R − KC.
In the equilibrium, the physical-channel consumers alwayspurchase from
retailer C. The multi-channel consumers will purchase from retailer C ifPE − PC >
g, and from retailer E otherwise. If retailer C chargesR − KC, it sells only to the
physical-channel consumers. On the other hand, retailer C makes the same expected
profits if it charges a price in the support ofFC(p). Therefore,
EπC(p) = (1 − β)(R − KC − PM) − W − VC (2.8)
EπC(p) = [(1 − β) + β(1 − FE(p + g))](p − PM) − W − VC (2.9)
Solving the two equations above results in:














(1 − β)(R − KC − PM)
p − g − PM
]
Similarly, we have
EπE(p) = βδ(R − KC + g − PM) − W (2.10)
EπE(p) = β[(1 − FC(p − g))](p − PM) − W (2.11)
Therefore:
FC(p) = 1 −
δ(R − KC + g − PM)
p + g − PM




PE − g = δ(R − KC + g − PM) − g + PM
PE = (1 − β)(R − KC − PM) + g + PM
⇒ δ =
(1 − β)(R − KC − PM) + g
R − KC + g − PM
= 1 − β +
βg
R − KC + g − PM
(2.12)
From Equations (2.8)-(2.12), we can easily get the price distribution func-
tions for case 1.
Similarly, we can get the price distribution functions for case 2 and case 3.

Proof of Proposition 2.2
From Proposition 2.1 and Equation 2.5, the fixed fee only influences whether
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retailers will accept the contract. The wholesale price influences retailers’ pricing
strategy and determines which retailer makes higher profits. Therefore the stages
of the game can be modified in the following manner without changing anything:
In stage 1, the manufacturer chooses the distribution strategy and the whole-
sale price. The manufacturer also promises non-negative profits for retailers. In
stage 2 and stage 3, the retailers make service and pricing decisions. In stage 4’ the
manufacturer charges the fixed fee. The manufacturer’s optimal fixed fee is such
that one retailer will make zero profits and the other retailer makes non-negative
profits. More specifically suppose that before stage 4’ the two retailers’ profits
(after they pay the wholesale price but before they pay the fixed fee) areπ ′C and




E), and finally EπC = π
′
C − W, EπE = π
′
E − W.
Therefore, the manufacturer’s profit isPM + 2 · min(π ′C, π
′
E). In other words, the
manufacturer’s ability to extract profits from the two channels is restricted by the
less profitable retailer. From equation (2.4), the manufactrer can get all the chan-
nel profits only whenPM is such thatPM = (UC − KC) − (βg+ vC)/(1− β)2 and
the two retailers make equal profits. IfPM < (UC − KC) − (βg + vC)/(1 − β)2,
we haveπ ′C > π
′
E, so the manufacturer’s profit is:
πbothM = PM + 2π
′
E = 2β(1 − β)(UC − KC) + [1 − 2β(1 − β)] PM (2.13)
On the other hand, ifPM > (UC − KC) − (βg + vC)/(1− β)2, we haveπ ′C < π
′
E,
so the manufacturer’s profit is:
πbothM = PM + 2π
′
C = 2(1 − β)(UC − KC) + (2β − 1)PM − 2vC (2.14)
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When both channels are chosen, from the equations (2.13) and (2.14), it can
be easily shown that whenβ > 0.5, the manufacturer’s profits increase withPM .
So it will choosePM as high as possible. The highest wholesale price retailer C
can accept isUC − KC − vC/(1 − β). On the other hand, the highest wholesale
price retailer E can accept isUC − KC + g/[β(1 − β)]. The highest wholesale
price the manufacturer can set should be the minimum of thesetwo. As a result,
PM 6 UC − KC −vC/(1−β), and either retailer C or retailer E makes zero profits.
Therefore, if retailer C provides product information, themanufacturer’s profits will
be PM as it cannot charge a positive fixed fee, and
πbothM = PM 6 R − KC − VC/(1 − β) < R − KC − VC (2.15)
When β > 0.5 and retailer C does not provide product information, the
manufacturer’s profits will be:
πbothM = PM 6 r − KC (2.16)
From equations (2.1), (2.5), (2.15), and (2.16), it is clearthat as long as
β > 0.5, the manufacturer will not choose both the channels. The intuition is
that when a large proportion of consumers have access to bothretailers, the price
competition will be too severe. As a result, the manufacturer will not choose both
channels whenβ > 0.5.
From equations (2.13) and (2.14), it can be easily shown thatw enβ 6 0.5,
the manufacturer’s profit increases withPM whenPM 6 P∗M = (UC −KC)−(βg+
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vC)/(1 − β)2 and decreases withPM when PM > P∗M . As a result, it will choose
P∗M = (UC − KC) − (βg + vC)/(1 − β)
2 to get all the channel profits. In this
circumstance,πM = PM + 2π ′C = PM + 2π
′
E. Therefore,










The Impact of IT on Vertical
Integration
3.1 Introduction
There is a significant literature in IS examining the coordination capabilities of IT
[46, 15]. This literature suggests that by lowering external coordination costs, IT
will lead to an overall shift towards more use of markets to cordinate economic
activity. Hitt [49] provides empirical evidence that the use of IT is associated with a
decrease in vertical integration (VI). Similarly, Dewan etal. [34] and Hitt [49] find
that less vertically integrated firms have higher demand forIT capital, implying that
these firms invest in more IT to coordinate with external suppliers.
The transaction cost economics (TCE) literature [28, 112] suggests that mar-
kets generally have production cost advantages due to specialization, economies
of scale, and market-induced efficiency. However, there arecosts (e.g., coordina-
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tion, writing and monitoring contracts, and opportunism) associated with market
exchanges. Since IT can reduce some of these costs, IS researchers have argued
that IT will lead to greater use of markets [25, 26], and consequently the levels of
VI will decrease.
Not withstanding the above observations about VI in some strategy and IS
literatures, over the last 25 years, the average level of VI in the economy appears to
have increased. Fan and Lang [39], for example, examine multi-segment firms and
report that between 1979 and 1997, the average level of VI increased by about 40%.
If we examine all the firms in the COMPUSTAT database, the average level of VI
has not decreased, but increased in the last 20-30 years. Figure 3.1 plots the level of
VI for recent periods for multi-segment firms and for all the firms in the economy.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the pattern of increase in the level ofvertical integration
for multi-segment and all the firms has persisted1.
Given that the levels of investments in IT have continually increased over
the years, the increasing trend in VI is surprising. It is possible that IT is used
extensively to reduce internal coordination costs, and notjust external coordination
costs. Since there is a strong evidence in the IS literature that IT investments are
associated with a decrease in VI, it requires us to explore further and explain the
possible gaps across different streams of research.
Consider the following two scenarios. In the semiconductor &electronics
manufacturing – a dynamic industry – OEMs like Cisco, Ericsson, Nortel Networks,
1There is a jump in the level of VI in 1998. This is partially dueto SFAS 131, the new segment
reporting standard that has lead to an increase in the numberof s gments reported by many firms
























Figure 3.1: Trend in Vertical Integration
3Com, Phillips Electronics, etc., outsource manufacturingto contract manufactur-
ers like Solectron, and use IT to reduce external coordinatio costs [53]. Generally,
the level of VI in this industry is quite low. In contrast, in astable industry like the
petroleum industry, firms such as BP, ChevronTexaco, Shell etc. coordinate pro-
duction (exploration, drilling, pumping, refining) and distr bution (from refineries,
to terminals, to roadside gas stations) in large verticallyintegrated organizations
[88]. In this environment, firms use IT to reduce internal coordination costs [114].
Thus, under different competitive environments, IT may reduce coordination costs
differently.
The above examples raise the question whether coordinationcosts can be
the basis to make the argument that IT will lead to a decrease in VI. Therefore, the
goal of this paper is to examine (a) the impact of firms’ competitiv environment on
76
how IT affects the level of VI, and (b) how the interaction betw en IT and the level
of VI impacts firms’ coordination and production costs.
In this study, we analyze firms included in 1995-1997 InformationWeek 500
and COMPUSTAT. The research makes two important contributions. First, the anal-
ysis suggests that the competitive environment moderates the impact of IT on VI
— in a more dynamic environment IT is associated with a decrease in VI, and in a
more stable environment IT is associated with an increase inVI. Second, the study
provides empirical evidence that IT reduces coordination csts. The analysis also
suggests that the use of IT to organize production in more vertically integrated firms
is associated with an increase in production costs. Given thimpact of IT on coor-
dination and production costs (which favor lower levels of VI) the finding that IT
is associated with an increase in VI in more stable environments is not consistent
with the coordination cost argument about the impact of IT onVI. Therefore, the
analysis suggests that there is a need to go beyond efficiencyconsiderations and
incorporate strategic reasons for vertical integration
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory
and the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data and the variables, and section 4
presents the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes with adiscussion of the results,
and presents directions for future research.
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses
Below we first examine how a firm’s competitive environment influences the rela-
tionship between IT and VI, and then examine the performance(i.e., the coordina-
77
tion and production cost) implications of the interaction between IT and VI.
3.2.1 Competitive Environment and the Choice of VI level
We assess an environment by the uncertainty in demand and by its competitive
stability. Dynamic environments2 are characterized by uncertainty about, and un-
predictability of, customer tastes and preferences, and pro uction and service tech-
nologies [77]. Firms can respond to this uncertainty by organizing more activities
internally. For example, Walker and Weber [108] found that demand uncertainty
increased the likelihood of internal production in automobile manufacturing. Al-
ternatively, firms can choose to reduce their VI level to maintain flexibility, as they
require a changing set of assets and capabilities to compete[106, 103]. In contrast to
dynamic environments, in stable competitive environments, as ets and capabilities
are more enduring and operational efficiency and market power are key [38]. Thus,
firms can take advantage of stable market conditions by organizing more activities
inside the firm [47]. Alternatively, firms can choose to focuson their core com-
petencies and opt for narrow vertical specialization [83].These arguments suggest
that firms in different environmental contexts may make different commitments in
specialized assets, and choose different levels of VI.
When demand is very unpredictable, the likelihood of excess specialized
capacity without alternative use, or insufficient capacity, increases. D’Aveni and
Ilinitch [32], for example, find that in dynamic environments vertically integrated
firms are associated with higher risk, as they are less adaptive. Vertically integrated
2We use the terms dynamic environment and demand uncertaintyinterchangeably depending on
the grammatical context.
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firms have many vertical links between their different units, leading to high inter-
dependence among them. Such interdependence may make it hard to adapt because
of the difficulties in changing strategies, abandoning obsolete technologies, or fill-
ing unevenly balanced upstream or downstream capacity. In dnamic environments,
firms may be better off by reducing their VI, and instead usingIT to coordinate with
external partners with the necessary assets and capabilities. Folta [41], for example,
found technological uncertainty to be associated with a preference for collaboration
over acquisition (i.e., vertical integration), as a way of economizing on the cost of
committing to a technology with uncertain demand and as a more flexible and faster
mechanism to adapt to changes in technology.
Lee [70] discusses how firms in Computer and electronics industries where
technologies change rapidly and demand is very unpredictable, use electronic ex-
changes to collaborate on design. These electronic exchanges allow firms to share
product content information to support product changes that reduces cycle time for
new product introductions and improves responsiveness. Here contract manufactur-
ers like Solectron provide manufacturing capacity to meet fluctuating demand [53].
Solectron has established a web-enabled extranet that allows information sharing
with customers. Thus, OEMs make reduced commitments in manufacturing capac-
ity and instead use IT to coordinate production with Solectron.
Now consider an environment where demand is steady (or increasing), but
competitors behave like symmetric oligopolists and sell standardized goods to ho-
mogeneous markets (e.g., Petroleum industry). In stable competitive environments
firms may have the incentive to perform more activities interally, thereby increas-
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ing the level of VI. In this environment, there are fewer threats from substitute
products and lower risks of radical change introduced by newcompetitors, and the
competitive dynamics do not involve aggressive competition [43]. Under these con-
ditions, firms can safely gear up to produce more in-house to increase revenue and
capture wider value add and margin by integrating vertically [47]. Increasing VI
can also increase entry barriers [94], enhance market power(i.e., control input and
output prices), offer opportunities for creating one-stopshopping that can increase
switching costs [19], and provide experience curve advantages [1]. Hence, in com-
petitively stable markets vertical integration may offer different advantages.
Firms can use IT to organize more activities internally as well as use IT to
coordinate more activities with external suppliers. The arguments presented above
imply that how IT is used is influenced by the characteristicsof the environment.
This leads to the following hypotheses:
H1 (a): As demand uncertainty increase, IT is likely to be associated with
greater decrease in vertical integration.
H1 (b): As competitive stability increases, IT is likely to be associated with
greater increase in vertical integration.
3.2.2 Performance Implications of the Impact of IT on Vertical
Integration
IT has implications for the coordination and production cost in the value chain that
affect the level of VI chosen by a firm [46]. In this section we examine the impact
of IT on coordination and production cost.
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Coordination Cost
Coordination cost is the cost of finding suppliers and partners, negotiating and spec-
ifying delivery arrangements, monitoring execution of contracts, and taking correc-
tive actions when required. Information technologies suchas the Internet and open
standards like eXtensible Markup Language (XML) can lower firms’ cost of co-
ordinating with members of the value chain [73]. In this regard, IT can reduce
coordination costs.
A firm may choose to respond to its environment by increasing its VI. For
example, in the context of distribution, John and Weitz [57]found that the like-
lihood of a direct channel (rather than intermediaries) increases with uncertainty.
Nevertheless, coordination of production and informationfl ws is very complex in
vertically integrated firms. Subunits in vertically integrated firms have to adapt to
demand and other fluctuations by extensively coordinating transfers from one line
of business to another. However, information sharing can reduc coordination costs
in vertically integrated firms [33]. Brews and Tucci [14] report that IT can reduce
coordination costs relating to information gathering, decision making, and compli-
ance monitoring needed when producing internally. Similarly, Lee and Billington
[55] suggest that firms can share production plans, capacity, demand and inventory
information to coordinate the value chain and substitute information for inventory.
In this regard, IT can reduce coordination costs by making information transpar-
ent, and enabling production and distribution schedules tobe ptimized [70]. For
example, the adopters of ERP systems, software often used forreal-time informa-
tion sharing and coordination in vertically integrated firms, show superior coordi-
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nation performance [50]. Also, firms that have IT capabilities to share information
have observed superior operational and financial performance [6]. In this regard,
the organization of the value chain where a firm performs activities within a more
vertically integrated structure reflects managerial choice f using IT-based internal
coordination to respond to the environment faced by the firm.
As an alternative to performing more activities internally, a firm may choose
to respond to its environment by becoming less vertically integrated. In this con-
text, IT can reduce the cost of coordinating with external suppliers. Clemons and
Row [25] and Clemons et al. [26] argue that IT can reduce the costof exchanging
information and the cost of monitoring the performance of other participants in the
value chain. IT can also be used to search, identify, and coordinate with external
suppliers. Gosain et al. (2004), for example, find that through modular design of
interconnected processes and structured data connectivity, IT enabled supply chains
provide the flexibility to support changes in orders (offering flexibility) as well as
the ability to partner with different supply chain players (partnering flexibility).
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) systems are examples of technologies
used to coordinate with suppliers. EDI systems decrease coordination costs as they
are associated with fewer shipment errors and better quality sh pments [99], and
decrease in delayed payments as well as credit orders [80]. Like the EDI systems
in the manufacturing context, firms in the retail industry are increasingly relying on
Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) tools [70]. These
IT initiatives have reduced coordination costs in the retail industry by lowering
inventory levels and by reducing stock outs [68].
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Though there may exist differences in coordinating the value chain in dif-
ferent environments, the above arguments suggest that IT can reduce coordination
costs whether firms respond to their environment by performing more activities in-
ternally (i.e., if they choose less VI) or by coordinating more activities with external
partners (i.e., if they choose more VI). These arguments lead to the following hy-
pothesis:
H2: IT is associated with a decrease in coordination cost.
Production Cost
Production cost includes the cost of material and labor involved in producing goods
and services. The impact of IT on production cost is contingent on the environment
and the level of VI. When demand is very unpredictable, there is a risk of supply
failure to the customer (e.g., where there is stock out due tonderproduction) or the
risk of overproduction for the firm. In response to demand uncertainty, a firm may
choose to use IT to perform activities in a more vertically integrated organization,
especially when demand uncertainty makes it difficult to coordinate with external
suppliers [31]. In this case, managers suffer from “illusion of control” that they can
manage the uncertainty by conducting more activities internally.3
In environments with significant demand uncertainty if a firmuses IT to
perform activities in a more vertically integrated structure, such organization may
increase production costs. The argument is that if a firm invests in many special-
ized assets in uncertain environments, it will often be saddled with assets that are
3Illusion of control [67] is the tendency for human beings to believe that they can control or at
least influence outcomes which they clearly cannot
83
not useful when conditions (e.g., consumers’ tastes and preferences, technologies)
change. Internal production may also lead to a cost disadvantage because of the
inability to achieve efficient scale in production [101]. Thus, production costs can
increase with VI as the uncertainty of the environment increases. Also, in dynamic
environments, if a firm performs more activities internally, the difficulty of orga-
nizing production due to unpredictable demand may result inprocurement of ma-
terial at a premium, or shipment through expensive mode (e.g., air shipping). Dy-
namic demand conditions may also require many change ordersthat lead to more
re-work. Similarly, rush orders may require overtime labor, increasing production
costs. Thus, production costs can increase with VI as demanduncertainty increases.
However, if firms choose a lower level of VI and instead use IT to coordinate more
activities with suppliers with specialized assets necessary for the new environment,
then such external coordination can reduce production costs. For example, in the
electronics industry, firms use B2B exchanges (e.g., Convergeand e2open) to find
and coordinate activities with suppliers with specific assets and capabilities [70].
Such IT based coordination with external suppliers avoids risky capital investments
and also saves costs associated with change, rework, and exception management
that are associated with increase in production costs in more ve tically integrated
firms.
In competitively stable environments, a firm may use IT to perform more
activities inside a vertically integrated organization. If the firm has significant mar-
ket share, then performing more activities internally can reduce production costs,
provided that the firm is able to achieve economies of scale. Internal production
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can also provide learning and experience curve advantages [1]. However, having
in-house captive demand may give rise to agency problems [37] that can raise pro-
duction costs, since in-house production units often do nothave the incentives to
be as efficient as market suppliers. Markets enforce disciplne and efficiency on
suppliers, which may be absent under internal production.
In summary, the above arguments suggest that use of IT to organize produc-
tion in more vertically integrated firms is likely to be associated with increase in
production costs. In contrast, if firms use IT to coordinate more activities with ex-
ternal partners (i.e., if they choose lower level of VI), production costs may fall as
firms can benefit from the scale advantage of specialists and also avoid risky capital
investments and agency problems that are associated with internal production. The
above arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
H3: Use of IT to organize production in more vertically integrated firms is
likely to be associated with increase in production costs.
3.3 Data and Variable Measures
3.3.1 Data
This study uses data from multiple sources. Firm level IT spending data from 1995
to 1997 are drawn from InformationWeek 500. This list was compiled annually
by Information Week, together with Computer Intelligence (CI), and has been used
in prior research in IS [8]. We match the IT spending data for the firms listed in
InformationWeek with data from COMPUSTAT. We also use data from the Bureau
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of Economic Analysis (BEA) to estimate the level of VI.
3.3.2 Variable Measures
IT Spending
Two commonly used measures of IT spending are employed: (i) annu l IT budget,
and (ii) the ratio of IT budget to sales. The annual IT budget for each firm in
InformationWeek 500 was compiled by Information Week from telephone surveys.
The sales data was obtained from COMPUSTAT. The annual IT budget and sales
data were then adjusted using the price and inflation index from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Vertical Integration
Vertical integration refers to the extent to which a firm carries production processes
from raw materials to the final product within its boundaries[95]. Three methods
have been used in the literature to estimate firms’ vertical integration: the ratio of
value added to sales, the VIC index by Maddigan [72], and the vertical relatedness
index by Fan and Lan [39]. The ratio of value added to sales is not suitable for
our cross-industry study since we cannot meaningfully compare VI among firms
in different industries. In the value added to sales measureof VI, the firm produc-
ing the input will have a higher value added to sales ratio than t e firm producing
the final output, even though there may exist no difference inthe VI levels of the
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firms [3, 69].4 Though both Maddigan’s, and Fan and Lang’s VI measures use
the Input-Output table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), Maddigan’s
index ignores the level at which a firm participates in a specific industry. For exam-
ple, a car manufacturer will report the same value of VI no matter whether its tire
factory contributes 1% or 100% of the tires its car factory uses. Accordingly, we
employ the index by Fan and Lang [39] as the measure for VI.
To assess VI, the following three step process is used. First, we investi-
gate each firm’s segment information in COMPUSTAT’s Segment database. For
each firm, its primary segment (the 4-digit-SIC segment withthe highest sales) is
identified, and all the other segments are considered as secondary segments. Sec-
ond, for each secondary segment, we calculate the vertical relatedness between this
secondary segment and the primary segment based on the 1997 Input-Output (IO)
table from BEA.5 The value of the vertical relatedness between the two segments
is determined by two factors: (i) the dollar value of the secondary segment’s output
required to produce the primary segment’s output, and (ii) the dollar value of the
primary segment’s output required to produce the secondarysegment’s output. If
the two segments have strong make-buy relationship according to the material flow
data in the IO table, they will have a high value of vertical relat dness. Third, based
on the calculation from the first two steps, we assess each firm’s VI level using the
4Here is an example provided by Adelman [3]. Suppose that there are 3 firms in an industry.
Assume that the first firm buys nothing and sells its products to firm 2. Firm 2 manufactures using
the input from firm 1 and sells to firm 3, a distributor. If each of the 3 firms contributes 1/3 of the
total value added by the industry, firm 1 would have a value added-sales ratio of 1, while firm 2 has
a ratio of 0.5 and firm 3 has a ratio of 1/3. If firm 2 integrates backwards to absorb firm 1, its new
ratio will be 1. But if it integrates forwards to absorb firm 3,the new firm will have a ratio of 2/3.
5The table reports for each pair of industries say,i and j , the dollar value ofi ’s output required







In the above formula,Wj is the ratio of thej th secondary segment’s sales to the
total sales of all the secondary segments, andVj is the vertical relatedness between
the j th secondary segment and the primary segment. If a firm’s largest secondary
segment(s) has (have) very strong vertical relatedness with its primary segment,
then the firm will have a high VI index and will be regarded as being highly vertical
integrated.
Competitive Environment
Two measures are used for competitive environment: (i) demand uncertainty, and
(ii) four-firm concentration ratio. The demand uncertaintymeasure reflects the in-
stability/variance in industry sales in the industries a firm participates in. For each
firm, past five years’ data on sales are used to calculate the demand uncertainty for
each year. More specifically, demand uncertainty is calculated using the following
regression equation:
ln(yt) = a + bxt + et
whereyt is the yearly sales of a particular industry the firm participates in, andxt is
the year. Growth rate is the antilog of the estimate of the regression slope (b). As
suggested by Keats and Hitt [63] demand uncertainty is the antilog of the standard
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error of the regression slope (b).6
The four-firm concentration ratio is the sum of the market shares of the top
four market share leaders in an industry. A high four-firm concentration ratio im-
plies a stable competitive environment. For example, when an industry has a few
well established players, each incumbent knows who their competitors are and how
they will behave, thus there is less uncertainty about the nature of the competitive
interaction [63].
One advantage of the demand uncertainty and four-firm concentration ra-
tio combination of measures for competitive environment isthat they complement
each other. As discussed earlier, since demand uncertaintyis related to the vari-
ance in sales over time, it measures uncertainty on the demand (co sumer) side of a
firm. Four-firm concentration ratio, on the other hand, is a simple measure of uncer-
tainty on the supply (competition) side of the firm. When calculating the demand
uncertainty (or four firm concentration ratio) of a firm that operates in multiple in-
dustries, we weight demand uncertainty in each industry with the proportion of the
firm’s sales from that industry. The two measures of competitiv environment are
calculated using the COMPUSTAT Segment database.
6We also run the analysis with two other alternative measuresof demand uncertainty: (i) antilog
of the standard error normalized by the sales of that industry - as smaller industries may have more
variability, and (ii) antilog of the standard error normalized by the growth rate of the industry - as




We are interested in the impact of firms’ VI on coordination and production costs.
We use three different measures for coordination cost: (i) Selling, General, & Ad-
ministrative cost divided by Sales (SGA), (ii) Inventory turnover, i.e., Cost of Goods
Sold divided by Average Inventory, and (iii) Receivables turnover, i.e., Sales divided
by Average Receivables. SGA reflects the selling and administrative costs incurred
to coordinate activities inside the firm and with suppliers and customers, and thus
is an aggregate measure of coordination cost [33]. Inventory turnover indicates the
efficiency with which a firm converts inventory into sales, thus it reflects the effi-
ciency of coordination with suppliers [49]. Similarly, Receivables turnover reflects
the efficiency of coordination with customers [49].
The second performance variable of interest is the production cost. Pro-
duction cost is measured as the Cost of Goods Sold divided by Sales [33]. The
data for all the performance measures is drawn from COMPUSTAT. As this is a
cross-industry study and performance varies from industryto industry, we normal-
ize performance (e.g., production cost) by dividing a firm’sproduction cost by the
average production cost of all the firms in the same industry.
Industry Capital Intensity
Industry capital intensity is an alternative explanation fr the level of VI as firms
in capital intensive industries are expected to be more vertically integrated [15].
Thus, Industry Capital Intensity is included as a control variable. This variable is
calculated from COMPUSTAT Segment database. For each segment (id tified as
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an SIC/NAICS code) i, we calculate its total assets (ATi ) and its total sales (S AL Ei )
based on the segment data from all the firms that participate in s gmenti . If a firm













In other words, the Industry Capital Intensity of a firm is the capital intensity of all
the industries the firm participates in weighted by its salesin those industries.
The other control variables in the study include Capital Structure - ratio of
total liabilities to sales [51], and Debt to Equity ratio [49]. The level of VI and
coordination and production costs may also be influenced by the scale of operations
and the number of employees involved in operations. So salesand the number
of employees are also included as control variables. Similarly, firms with larger
market share and firms in growing industries may be more vertically integrated.
Thus, market share and industry growth rates are also used ascontrol variables for
VI [49]. Also, manufacturing firms may have different levelsof VI compared to
service, and agriculture and mining firms. Therefore, industry type is also used as
a control variable. The level of IT investments may be influenced by the alternative
investment opportunities a firm has, so Growth Options - ratio of book vale of assets
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Table 3.1: Sample Characteristics
Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Deviation
IT Budget(in Million Dollars) 0.634 5105.01 228.52 477.8
IT/Sales 0.000 0.374 0.007 0.020
VI(Vertical Integration) 0.000 0.293 0.020 0.044
UNC(Demand Uncertainty) 0.002 0.346 0.040 0.037
FOUR(Four-firm concentration) 0.126 1.000 0.645 0.218
CAP(Capital Intensity) 0.242 70.662 4.403 9.908
MS(Market Share) 0.003 1.000 0.215 0.211
GRR(Growth Rate) -0.193 0.852 0.087 0.122
DEQ(Debt to Equity) -138.918 125.298 2.213 10.950
GROP(Growth Options) 0.092 43.252 1.943 2.989
CST(Capital Structure) 0.101 8.966 0.988 1.272
SALES(in Million Dollars) 75.13 168919.00 10530.09 18788.02
EMP(Employees in thousands) 0.57 825.00 47.2066 87.02
COST(Production Cost) 0.008 1.531 0.875 0.308
SGA 0.006 2.703 0.679 0.422
Inv Turns(Inventory Turnover) 0.017 9.580 0.958 0.785
to market vale of the firm [34] - is used as a control variable for IT.7
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 The Models
We are interested in two research questions: (i) how does theinteraction between IT
and the competitive environment influence a firm’s VI level, and (ii) how does the
interaction between IT and VI influence firms’ coordination and production costs.
Prior studies [34, 49] have shown that OLS estimation will suffer from simultaneity
bias since a firm will choose its IT investment given its VI level, and vice-a-versa.
7Please refer to the regression models for the set of controlsused for a specific regression model.
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Hausman tests on our dataset also show that VI and IT budget are ndogenous, thus
rejecting the OLS formulation in favor of two-stage least squares (2SLS). There-
fore, we use a 2-equation model for the first research question as causality may run




V Ii = α0 + α1I Ti + α2U NCi + α3I Ti · U NCi + α4FOU Ri
+α5I Ti · FOU Ri + α6C APi + α7MSi + α8CSTi
+α9DE Qi + α10Salesi + α11E M Pi + α12G RRi
+α13T1i + α14T2i + α15T3i + uv
(V I )
I Ti = γ0 + γ1V Ii + γ2U NCi + γ3FOU Ri + γ4V Ii · U NCi
+γ5V Ii · FOU Ri + γ6C APi + γ7Salesi
+γ8DE Qi + γ9CSTi + γ10G RO Pi + uz
(I T )
where VI (VIi ), IT (IT i ), demand uncertainty (UNCi ), four-firm concentration ratio
(FOURi ), industry capital intensity (CAPi ), market share (MSi ), capital structure
(CSTi ), debt to equity (DEQi ), sales (Salesi ), the number of employees (EMPi ),
growth rate (GRRi ), and growth options (GROPi ), represent the characteristic of
firm i respectively.8 We also use three dummy variables to serve as control variables
for VI. T1 is 1 if firm i has segment(s) in agriculture or mining industries, T2 is 1 if
firm i participates in manufacturing industries, and T3 is 1 if firm i participates in
service industries.
8Based on the rules widely used in empirical studies, if a variable is a dollar amount (such as IT
budget), or number of people (such as number of employees), it appears in logarithmic form. Other
variables, such as VI and IT spending such as the ratio of IT budget to sales, are in their original
form.
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For the second research question, the following model is used:
P Fi = β0 + β′1I Ti + β2V Ii + β3I Ti · V Ii + β4U NCi
+β5FOU Ri + β6C APi + β7MSi (P F)
+β8CSTi + β9DE Qi + β10Salesi + β11E M Pi + uR
where the dependant variableP F is performance (coordination cost or pro-
duction cost).
The VI, IT, and PF models also use interaction terms. For variables that
are involved in the interaction (e.g., IT, UNC, and FOUR in theVI model), we
center them by subtracting the mean from each variable. Centering can reduce
multi-collinearity among these variables and make the regression coefficients more
meaningful. For example, after we center IT, UNC, and FOUR in the VI model,α1
is the impact of IT when UNC and FOUR are at their average level.
Two-stage least squares method (2SLS) is used to assess eachmodel. In-
strumental variables include 2-digit SIC segment and year dummy variables. Each
2-digit SIC industry segment instrument variable takes a value of 1 if the firm partic-
ipates in this 2-digit industry and 0 otherwise. These exogen us variables capture
industry specific effects [110]. We also use 2 year dummy variables,Y1995 and
Y1996. For example, if a data point is for the year 1995, thenY1995= 1. The year
dummy variables capture any variances that are related to time, such as IT prices,




Table 3.2 presents the 2SLS estimates of the VI model that examines how the com-
petitive environment moderates the impact of IT on VI.9 In the VI Model, the over-
all effect of IT on VI isα1+α3UNC+α5FOUR. Hereα1 reflects the effect of IT when
demand uncertainty and four-firm concentration ratio are attheir average level.10 α3
andα5are the interaction effects related to demand uncertainty ad four firm con-
centration ratio respectively.
Table 3.2: The VI Model
(Constant) -0.143** (0.061) CST -0.007** (0.003)
I T -0.001 (0.005) DE Q 0.000 (0.000)
U NC -0.103 (0.19) G RR -0.017 (0.06)
I T · U NC (α3) -0.329** (0.14) E M P -0.037*** (0.007)
FOU R 0.057** (0.025) S AL E S 0.037*** (0.008)
I T · FOU R(α5) 0.046** (0.021) T1 0.009 (0.01)
C AP 0.002*** (0.001) T2 -0.021 (0.02)
MS -0.035 (0.028) T3 -0.004 (0.005)
N: 596; AdjustedR2: 0.086; F Statistic: 4.730
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.
∗ ∗ ∗ − p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ −p < 0.05, ∗ − p < 0.10
As indicated in Table 3.2, bothα3andα5 are significant.α3 is negative and
significant (at p = 0.016 level), suggesting that IT is associated with greater decrease
in VI in more dynamic environments. Thus, H1 (a) is supported. α5 is positive and
significant (at p = 0.030 level), suggesting that IT is associated with greater increase
9Please note that though we report the R-square here, the R-square has no natural interpretation
(Wooldridge [113]).
10Since the three variables (IT, UNC, and FOUR) are centered inthis model, their means, after
centering, are zero.
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in VI in more stable competitive environments. Thus, H1 (b) is also supported. The
moderating role of competitive environment on the impact ofIT on VI is illustrated
in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. To make the illustrations simple, when studying the impact
of demand uncertainty we let four-firm concentration ratio to be at its average level,
and vice a versa. We probe the impacts using the procedure in Cohen et. al ([29], pp.




















Figure 3.2: Moderating Role of Demand Uncertainty
As shown in Figure 3.2, when demand uncertainty is below -0.01,12 IT has
a positive impact on VI. This impact is significant (at p = 0.06) when demand un-
certainty is -0.04. This suggests when demand uncertainty is very low firms use IT
11The procedure specifies the standard error of the simple slopat each point so that its signifi-
cance can be calculated.
12After centering, the range of demand uncertainty is from -0.04 to 0.35. More than 56% of the



















Figure 3.3: Moderating Role of Four-firm Concentration Ratio
to become more vertically integrated. However, as demand uncertainty increases,
the impact of IT becomes negative. When demand uncertainty isa it average level
(i.e., zero), firms use IT to become less vertically integrated. The overall impact of
IT is negative and significant (at p = 0.04 level) when demand ucertainty is 0.07.
In sum, the analysis suggests that as demand uncertainty increases, IT is associated
with a decrease in VI.
Figure 3.3 shows how four-firm concentration ratio influences the impact
of IT on VI. When the four-firm concentration ratio is below average (i.e., below
zero), IT has a negative impact on VI. This suggests that firmsuse IT to become
less vertically integrated when the four firm concentrationratio is below the average
level. However, when four-firm concentration ratio is aboveav rage, firms use
IT to become more vertically integrated. This impact is significant at 0.10 level
97
when concentration is at 0.25 and is significant at 0.05 levelwhen concentration is
0.35. This analysis suggests that as four firm concentrationratio increases, IT is
associated with an increase in VI.
The IT model
As discussed earlier, IT and VI choices are made simultaneously. In this section we
examine how IT investments are influenced by VI, demand uncertainty, and four
firm concentration ratio.
Table 3.3: The IT Model
(Constant) 3.573*** (0.611) CAP 0.033*** (0.01)
VI -0.656 (2.829) SALES 1.022*** (0.074)
UNC 1.091 (3.509) GOP -0.129*** (0.039)
FOUR 0.551 (0.435) DEQ 0.007 (0.008)
VI ·UNC (γ4) -402.703*** (151.611) CST 0.206*** (0.075)
VI ·FOUR (γ5) 50.472** (19.762)
N:575; AdjustedR2: 0.367; F Statistic:34.246
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.
∗ ∗ ∗ − p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ −p < 0.05, ∗ − p < 0.10
In the IT model, the impact of demand uncertainty on IT isγ2+γ4VI and
the impact of four firm concentration ratio on IT isγ3+γ5VI. Table 3.3 presents
the 2SLS estimates of the IT model. As shown in table 3.3,γ4 is negative and
significant (at p = 0.008 level). This suggests that when demand uncertainty is
high, a decrease in VI is associated with increase in IT investm nts. Similarly, the
coefficient ofγ5 is positive and significant (at p = 0.011 level). This indicates hat
in more stable competitive environments increase in VI is associated with increase





















Figure 3.4: Moderating Role of VI (a)
slopes (γ2+γ4VI andγ3+γ5VI) at selected points.13
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate these results graphically. In figure 3.4, when VI
is -0.02, the impact is positive and significant (at p =0.008 leve ) suggesting that in
dynamic environments decrease in VI is associated with increase in IT investments.
Similarly, when VI is 0.05, the impact is negative and significant (at p = 0.05 level),
suggesting that in dynamic environments increase in VI is associated with decrease
in IT investments. Figure 3.5 also yields consistent results. When VI is 0.02, the
impact is positive and significant (at p =0.03 level) suggesting hat in stable com-
petitive environments increase in VI is associated with increase in IT investments.
In summary, the VI and IT model provide results that support H1 (a) and H1 (b).
13Here we focus on the moderating role of VI in the impact of demand uncertainty and four firm
concentration ratio on IT. We also studied the moderating role of demand uncertainty and four firm






















Figure 3.5: Moderating Role of VI (b)
Performance
Table 3.4 shows the 2SLS estimates of the PF model. Since the performance mea-
sures are relative to sales, in Table 3.4, the ratio of IT budget to sales is used as the
measure for IT. In the above equation, the impact of IT on performance has two
parts. The first part,β1, reflects the ‘general’ impact of IT when VI is at the average
level. The second part,β3, reflects the impact of IT through its interaction with VI.
As the level of VI is an endogenous choice made by a firm, and since this choice is
influenced by IT, it is important to consider the impact of theinteraction between
IT and VI on performance. In this regardβ3 reflects how the use of IT to organize
activities in more vertically integrated (i.e., high VI), or less vertically integrated
firm (i.e., low VI) affects performance. Thus,β1+β3VI is the overall impact of IT
on performance.
100
Table 3.4: Performance Models
SGA Inventory Turnover Receivable Turnover Production Cost
(Constant) 1.127*** (0.427) 1.556** (0.774) 2.178*** (0.361) 0.393 (0.324)
VI 2.896** (1.204) 0.93 (0.28) 1.03 (1.058) -0.083 (0.943)
IT (β1) -13.696** (6.557) 45.274*** (17.174) 3.032 (7.994) -3.648 (5.138)
IT·VI (β3) 249.917** (105.013) -653.008** (271.661) 32.762 (125.966) 189.506** (85.058)
UNC 2.365 (1.608) -6.823** (2.81) -1.201 (1.329) -3.32*** (1.197)
FOUR -0.854*** (0.29) 0.635 (0.454) -0.255 (0.213) 0.074 (0.191)
CAP -0.023*** (0.006) -0.045*** (0.011) -0.003 (0.005) -0.02*** (0.004)
MS 0.963*** (0.286) -0.61 (0.498) 0.161 (0.232) 0.113 (0.211)
CST 0.062 (0.095) 0.018 (0.061) -0.084*** (0.028) 0.029 (0.023)
DEQ 0.00 (0.003) -0.015** (0.006) 0.005 (0.003) -0.005* (0.003)
EMP 0.131** (0.065) 0.113 (0.117) 0.056 (0.054) -0.075 (0.052)
SALES -0.123* (0.068) -0.066 (0.125) -0.171*** (0.058) 0.089 (0.054)
N 471 542 537 598
AdustedR2 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.09
F 4.82*** 3*** 3.563*** 6.16***
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Key:∗ ∗ ∗ − p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ −p < 0.05, ∗ − p < 0.10
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Coordination Cost SGA: Table 3.4 shows that IT has a negative ‘general’ impact
on SGA (significant at p = 0.031 level), and a positive impact on SGA (significant at
p = 0.014 level) through its interaction with VI. This suggests that IT is associated
with a decrease in coordination cost when VI is at the averagelevel. However, for
firms with higher levels of VI, IT’s negative impact on coordination cost weakens.
Moreover, for firms that use IT to organize their activities at a very high level of
vertical integration, the impact of IT on SGA may be positive. This is consistent
with the claim that there are bureaucracy costs associated with highly vertically
integrated organizations [33]. Overall, the analysis largely supports hypothesis H2.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the total impact of IT on SGA. The figure shows that the
overall impact of IT on SGA is influenced by the level of VI. WhenVI is less than
0.05, IT has negative impact on SGA. This holds for 90% of the firms.14 However,
when VI is higher than 0.05, IT has a positive impact on SGA. This suggests that for
firms whose VI is very high, IT may be associated with an increase in coordination
costs.
Inventory and Receivables Turnover: The analysis of the impact of IT on in-
ventory turnover is very similar to the analysis for SGA.15 IT has a positive general
impact (significant at p = 0.010 level) on inventory turnoverand a negative impact
(significant at p = 0.019 level) through its interaction withVI. Therefore, IT can
increase inventory turnover for firms with lower level of VI (specifically for firms
with VI of 0.06 or less). This analysis also largely supportshypothesis H2. In the
analysis of the impact of IT on receivables turnover, the general and the interaction
14After centering, VI has a range from -0.02 to 0.27. 90% of the firms have VI less than 0.05





















Figure 3.6: Impact of IT on SGA
impact of IT are not significant. Thus, the analysis with receivables turnover does
not support hypothesis H2.
Production Cost The impact of IT on production cost also has two components:
the general component and the component that is influenced bythe chosen level of
VI. As shown in Table 3.4, the general impact of IT is not significant, i.e., when VI
is at its average level, IT has no impact on production cost. However, the interaction
between IT and VI is positive and significant (at p = 0.027 level). This suggests that
the use of IT to organize production in more vertically integrated firms may be as-
sociated with increase in production costs. Figure 3.7 illustrates the overall impact
of IT on production cost. It is clear that for firms with higherl vels of VI (i.e., when
VI is above 0.02, which is associated with 15% of the firms in the sample), more




























Figure 3.7: Impact of IT on Production Cost
ment that the market has advantage in production cost and that organizing activities
inside vertically integrated organizations may lead to increase in production costs
[28, 74]. Thus hypothesis H3 is supported by the analysis.
In summary, H2 and H3 suggest that IT decreases (increases) coordination
and production costs when firms organize their activities inless (more) vertically
integrated structures. Thus IT favors less vertically integrated firms from efficiency
(i.e., coordination and production cost) point of view. However, H1 (b) suggests
that firms use IT to become more vertically integrated under sp cific circumstances.
This raises the question: why do some firms choose to be more vertically integrated
when it can increase coordination and production costs. Theimplication here is that
efficiency considerations, by themselves, do not explain the choice of VI in some
circumstances. This issue is explored further in the discussion section.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Before discussing the implications of the findings, it is important to recognize the
limitations of this study. The analysis was performed usingIT investment data
collected by InformationWeek. The Information Week 500 purportedly includes
leading users of IT in the US. To that extent the sample is not apurely random
sample. However, if we can show the differences in the impactof IT on VI under
different competitive environments using this sample, it can actually bolster our
claim. Further, this dataset has been used in prior researchto examine the economic
impact of IT investments [8]. Also, since these firms are leading users of IT, they are
likely to make more judicious use of IT that other firms can learn from. The data
may also be considered old. However, since the data predatesthe Internet boom
and bust periods, it may be free of the overreactions commonly associated with that
period.
The ability to use IT to cost-effectively coordinate with suppliers and busi-
ness partners has received much attention in the IS literatur . This stream of re-
search generally suggests that firms are likely to lower their VI and rely more on
markets. The analysis in this paper suggests that though IT may be associated with
decrease in VI, the impact of IT on VI is not uniform across allenvironments. In
more dynamic environments IT may be associated with greaterdecrease in VI as
firms try to maintain flexibility by reducing commitments in specialized assets and
instead use IT to coordinate more activities with outside partners and specialists.
We find that such organization of activities where a firm chooses a lower level of
VI may reduce production costs. This is consistent with TCE arguments that ven-
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dors may have lower production costs due to economies of scale, specialization and
market efficiency. However, interestingly, the analysis suggests that in more stable
competitive environments, a firm may use IT to organize more activities inside the
firm as there may exist opportunities to increase revenue, and c pture value add and
margin.
The IS literature suggests that IT is associated with decrease in VI as IT
reduces coordination costs. The research presented here sugg sts that IT reduces
coordination and production costs in less vertically integrated firms. Organizing
activities in more vertically integrated firm is associatedwith higher coordination
and production costs. Thus we should see a general decrease in VI. Given that for
firms in more stable competitive environments, IT is associated with increase in VI,
the coordination cost argument that IT will lead to a decrease in VI is not supported
in such environments.
The IS literature has so far concentrated on efficiency considerations, such
as coordination cost, to examine the impact of IT on VI. However, a key implica-
tion of this research is that firms may choose coordination (gvernance) structures
for strategic rather than efficiency reasons [82]. For example, an increasing pro-
portion of the value-add is shifting from manufacturing to service. Firms like IBM
and HP are moving from manufacturing to IT services. Firms are pushing down-
stream to capture this value-add by establishing direct rela ionships with customers
using IT and embedded IT [65]. Direct relationships allow firms to understand cus-
tomer preferences, build switching costs, and sell more products by cross-selling
and up-selling. Fronmueller and Reed [42], for example, find that forward integra-
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tion is associated with differentiation advantage. Thus, as the service component of
the economy increases, and firms integrate into downstream mrkets for strategic
reasons, it is important to look beyond efficiency considerations and take a more
integrative approach to study the impact of IT on VI. This strategic perspective is
also consistent with the recent call by Santos and Eisenhardt [91] to take a broader
look at organizational boundaries.
One strategic motive for VI is to use VI as an entry barrier. A vertically
integrated firm can raise costs for competitors by reducing the price of output or
by increasing the price of input. Thus, the threat that a large vertically integrated
firm can engage in price squeezing, deters entry of less integrated firms. For exam-
ple, in the petroleum industry discussed earlier, it may be argued that large firms in
this environment organize operations in vertically integrated structures, not for ef-
ficiency reasons, but to deter entry of specialist players indifferent markets. Antill
and Arnott [5] suggest that with the growth in the depth and liquidity of crude and
product markets, the case for vertically integrated operations in the oil industry has
become less convincing. They provide an analysis of the barriers to competition
and efficiency that vertically integrated “super majors” are ble to exploit.
The fashion industry provides another interesting exampleof the strategic
use of VI. In this industry product life cycles are short and differentiation advan-
tages built on product styling can be quickly imitated. Also, low cost global man-
ufacturing has become the norm where producers exploit lower labor costs in de-
veloping countries. However, even in this environment somevertically integrated
firms (e.g. Zara) have achieved competitive advantage by shifting competition to-
107
wards speed and timing [89]. In this strategy, vertical integration allows flexible
and fast cycle manufacturing with rapid learning about customer demand and pref-
erences, a strategy not available to the more efficient (in terms coordination and
production costs) but vertically disaggregated firm [64].
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